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Abstract
Steganography is the art of providing a secret communication 
channel for the transmission of covert information. At the same time, 
it is possible that it can be used by cyber criminals to conceal their 
works. This potential illegal use of steganography is the basis for 
the objectives in this thesis. This thesis initially reviews the possible 
flaws in current implementations of steganalysis. By using images from 
different camera types, this thesis confirms the expectation that the 
steganalysis performance is significantly affected by the differences in 
image sources. In this thesis we prove that image compression in a 
steganalysis process has an impact on the steganalysis performance, as 
claimed in the literature. A review of currently available steganalysis 
techniques, along with a proposal to overcome the said problems 
is also presented in this thesis. We propose a new technique for 
steganography that is based on conditional probability statistics. This 
new technique works on 72 features (conditional probability features) 
extracted for each image for the purpose of classification. Through 
experiments based on standard benchmarks, comparable classification 
accuracies have been achieved by this new approach. Furthermore, 
these new features demonstrated good performance when applied to 
image forensic tasks. Applied to images from four digital cameras, 
these new features are able to classify test images according to their 
sources with accuracy rates of 99.5% and 91.5% in both inter-camera 
and intra-camera model cases, respectively.
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1 Introduction
Steganography allows a user to hide a secret message within some cover objects 
in such a way that an adversary will not be able to detect the existence of the 
message. Steganography can be dated back to 440 BC, to the ancient Greek tale of 
Demaratus sending a warning by using a wax tablet and Histiaeus using a tattoo 
on his slave’s shaved head [52].
Steganography should be viewed separately from secure communication using 
cryptography (Figure 1.1). Consider a situation between Alice and Bob, where 
they can communicate by using cryptography techniques. It is secure in the sense 
that the third person, Eve will not understand the encrypted message; but Eve 
will realise that they are transmitting a secret message. W hat Eve could do 
is to terminate the communication between Alice and Bob so that they cannot 
communicate any further. By using steganography. Eve will view the data shared 
between Alice and Bob as a plain or normal file. Alice and Bob could then continue 
sharing the secret messages discreetly between the two of them, without Eve even 
realising.
Cryptography
Encrypted M essage
Hello.This is 
my secret 
m essage
Hello.This is 
my secret 
m essage
\
Bob Eve Alice
Steganography
Hello.This is Hello.This is
my secret my secret
m essage m essage
A
Bob
Stego Image
f
Eve
/ \
Alice
Figure 1 .1 ; Cryptography and steganography
In the real world, criminals have always sought ways to conceal their activities 
and the same goes for cyberspace crime. Computer forensic tools have been
used by investigators to perform specific tasks, such as recovering deleted files 
and reconstructing a user’s activities [39]. However, anti-forensic tools are also 
available to undermine computer forensic tools by performing specific tasks, such 
as erasing data, altering records or hiding information. Anti-forensic tools are 
becoming more frequently used by cyber criminals to cover their tracks and to 
prevent monitoring by authoritative bodies^.
According to Mukasey et al. [90], information regarding steganography and 
digital media such as images have high potential as digital evidence in cyber 
crime incidents, including copyright infringement, email-threats and child abuse 
or exploitation. By using steganography, cyber criminals can hide their tracks and 
it is very easy for forensics investigators to overlook vital details while searching 
for the evidence. Steganography tools that are easier to obtain and simpler to use, 
contribute to its popularity among cyber criminals.
In addition to the variety of steganography techniques, the diversity and 
availability of media for steganography also continue to grow rapidly. For example, 
if we only consider digital images and social networking websites, there are around 
750 photos uploaded and shared among its registered users every second on 
Facebook alone^.
According to Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas [57], a steganography system can 
be considered defeated if an attacker is able to prove the existence of a secret 
message. In other words, if a steganography system fails to disguise the embedded 
information, the secret communication has been exposed. Over the last decade 
a wide range of steganography techniques have appeared in the literature. 
Examples include the Spread Spectrum Image Steganography {SSIS) by Marvel 
et al. [85], Outguess by Proves [102], F5 by Westfeld [130] and Model Based 
steganography {MB) by Sallee [110].
In the meantime, a wide range of steganalysis techniques have been made 
available. Steganalysis allows an adversary to determine whether an intercepted 
object contains a secret message. In particular, a number of steganalysis 
techniques based on machine learning have emerged, such as steganalysis by using 
Wavelet Features by Lyu and Farid [82], Markov Features by Shi et al. [113] and 
the merged Markov-DCT Features by Pevny and Fridrich [100]. Such techniques 
tend to be blind, in the sense that it does not assume any particular steganography 
algorithm and can usually break a variety of algorithms. Other methods that are 
specific to a certain technique of steganography, such as steganalysis on F5 by 
Fridrich et al. [36], are categorised as non-blind techniques.
In this thesis, the focus is on the steganalysis of JPEG steganography, 
particularly because JPEG is the most popular image format on the Internet. 
Steganographic images can be shared by transmitting them, for instance by email, 
or by placing them on a web page for the receiver to browse and extract the message 
without being noticed. This steganalysis for JPEG steganography research should 
be of benefit in the general steganalysis research domain and be of help to the
^Reported by Dallaway, October, 2008, Infosecurity News, Accessed on September 2009, h ttp :  
/ / www. in fosecu rity -m agazin e . com/news/081031_Steganography_RSA.html 
^Reported by York on September 23, 2009, USA Today, Accessed on
19 August 2011, h ttp ://w w w .d isru p tivecon versation s.eom /2009 /09 /
usa-tod ay-750-photos-per-second-up loaded-to-facebook .h tm l
1.1. Thesis Contributions
real-world implementation of steganalysis, such as in digital forensic investigation.
1.1 Thesis Contributions
The contribution of this thesis is in two parts. The first part is the critical 
findings from the review on current steganalysis approaches. The second part 
is on the introduction and implementation of new features for steganalysis and 
camera identification problem.
1.1.1 Steganalysis Review: Issues on Image Sources and 
Double Compression
This thesis reviews the proposed machine learning based steganalysis 
implementations in the literature. It identifies several flaws in the current 
implementation of steganalysis. The steganalysis results seem to strongly depend 
on the properties of images used in classifier training. This is the first steganalysis 
problem found by this thesis and was published in the following conference 
proceeding:
• A.W.A. Wahab, J.A. Briffa, and H.G. Schaathun. 2009. On the Performance 
of Wavelet Decomposition Steganalysis with JSteg Steganography. In Digital 
Watermarking, Hyoung-Joong Kim, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and Anthony T. 
Ho (Eds.). Lecture Notes In Computer Science, Vol. 5450. Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin, Heidelberg 342-349.
This thesis also investigates a second problem related to the steganalysis 
implementation. The problem is caused by the effects from additional compression 
during the message embedding process. Many steganalysis techniques were found 
to be unable to discriminate between the effects of embedding and the effects of 
compression. We propose the use of a steganography algorithm which is able to 
avoid the compression during the embedding process. Findings of these works 
were published in the following conference proceedings:
• A.W.A. Wahab, H.G. Schaathun, and A.T.S. Ho. Markov Process Based 
Steganalysis by Using Second-Order Transition Probability Matrix. 8 th  
European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Academic 
Conferences Limited, 1-8, 2009.
• J.A. Briffa, H.G. Schaathun and A.W.A. Wahab. Has F5 Really Been 
Broken?. lET Digest, P17, 2009.
1.1.2 Novel Technique: Conditional Probability Features for 
Steganalysis
A new steganalysis technique based on conditional probability statistics is also 
proposed in this thesis. Known as CP Features^ these new features are shown to 
have comparable classification accuracy to the previously published techniques. 
This contribution was published in the following conference proceeding:
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• A.W.A. Wahab, J.A. Briffa, H.G. Schaathun, and A.T.S. Ho. Conditional 
Probability Based Steganalysis for JPEG Steganography. 2009 International 
Conference on Signal Processing Systems, pages 205 -209, 2009.
1.1.3 Novel Technique: Conditional Probability Features in 
Camera Identification
Besides the above contributions to steganalysis research, this thesis provides a 
new technique in the study of image forensics. The new CP Features identified in 
our proposed steganalysis technique can be used to match digital images with the 
cameras that are responsible for producing them, in both intra-camera model and 
inter-camera model identifications.
1.2 Structure of Thesis
The structure of the thesis consists of seven chapters as follows:
Chapter 2  discusses the background of steganography and a literature review 
on steganalysis research. Section 2 .2  gives an explanation on how we classify 
steganography techniques by looking at how it operates on a cover object. The 
operations are cover exploitation, cover modification and cover creation. In the 
same chapter, the differences between steganalysis approaches are shown to be 
based on the objective and the domain that it is working on.
Chapter 3 examines the different approaches taken in steganalysis research based 
on machine learning. The discussions are structured according to the common 
procedure in machine learning based steganalysis. The procedure includes object 
selection, object preparation, payload embedding, classifier training and classifier 
testing. At the end of this chapter, Section 3.5.2 proposes the use of confidence 
interval to support classification results.
Chapter 4 examines how the different image sources can affect the results of 
steganalysis. By using images from four different cameras, our findings have 
shown that the steganalysis techniques largely dependent on the availability of the 
informations regarding the cover image. Because of that reason, this chapter brings 
about the problem in relation to a real-world implementation of steganalysis, 
where the cover image source cannot necessarily be determined. This chapter 
also presents the review on the proposed steganalysis features in [113]. Extending 
the features with second-order Markov model, no improvement on the detection 
rate was achieved. Yet, it was found that detection on F5 was due to the effects 
of double compression and not to the effect of embedding. To address the issue. 
Section 4.3 proposes the use of F5 embedding algorithm which excluding the 
decompression and recompression process, named F5Py.
Chapter 5 introduces our proposed features for image steganalysis named CP 
Features. From the experiments, this chapter proves that the proposed features 
work as well as if not better than the previously published steganalysis features 
in terms of classification accuracy.
Chapter 6  uses the CP Features discussed in Chapter 5 in image forensic domain. 
Specifically, the proposed features are able to perform reliable detection on the
1.2. Structure of Thesis
image sources. For inter-camera model identification, images taken using four 
different camera models were utilised, while in intra-camera identification, images 
taken using four iPhone mobile phone cameras were used.
Chapter 7 offers a summary of this thesis, and a plan for future research work.
2 Steganology
This chapter discusses the background knowledge of steganography and 
steganalysis techniques found in the literature. It provides some basic information 
and ideas on the different approaches used in both steganography and steganalysis. 
Some of the techniques are discussed in detail together with explanations on related 
terms and methods used.
2.1 Concealing and Discovering
Steganology is a discipline of science, studying the hiding and the concealing of 
messages and also their detection and extraction. Steganography and steganalysis 
are two components of steganology as shown in Figure 2 .1 .
Steganology
Steganography! | Steganalysis
*  -  ;
Figure 2 .1 : Steganography and steganalysis as the components of steganology.
Steganographers work to develop better techniques to hide a secret message in a 
media file, such as an image. Whilst steganalysts are one who devise techniques to 
detect the reliability of the hidden secret. W ith the improved hiding and detecting 
techniques proposed, the tasks become more challenging for both parties.
Cox et al. [26] defined steganography as the act of covert communication tha t 
is only known to exist by the communicators (sender and receiver). Based on 
its undetectability^ properties, steganography is considered defeated when the 
existence of the embedded message is detected.
Figure 2 .2  shows a steganography and a steganalysis process. Consider S  as 
the steganography method. S  is used by steganographers to embed a payload P  
into a cover object to produce a stego object. In contrast, steganalysis is used by 
steganalysts to detect the existence of P  in a test object.
^Impossible to detect by any steganalysis algorithm
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Figure 2.2: Steganography and steganalysis process.
2.2 Types of Steganography
Three types of steganography are discussed by Shih [116]. The first type is 
technical steganography. It applies a scientific knowledge or method to hide a 
secret message. The use of invisible ink and microdots technique are examples of 
technical steganography.
The second type of steganography known as linguistic steganography, utilises 
written natural language to hide an information. Two categories of linguistic 
steganography are semagram and open codes. Semagram hides the secret message 
by using visual symbols or signs while open codes use specific patterns on 
document.
The third type of steganography is digital steganography which stems from the 
advent of computer technology. It is the science of hiding secret message in digital 
media such as digital image, audio and video content.
For Kipper [65], two basic types of steganography have been defined. They are 
linguistic steganography and technical steganography. The classification is similar 
to what was discussed by Shih [116] except for the digital steganography (named 
as computer-based method) as it is listed under technical steganography.
A different approach has been used by Fridrich [34] to classify steganography. 
It is based on the different steganography embedding functions. Three embedding 
functions have contributed to the following types of steganography:
• Steganography by Cover Selection where sender selects the cover to 
communicate the intended message.
• Steganography by Cover Synthesis where sender creates the cover to 
communicate the intended message.
• Steganography by Cover Modification where sender modifies an existing 
cover to communicate the intended message.
Corresponding to the approach proposed by Fridrich [34], we prefer to classify 
steganography based on how it operates on the cover as shown in Figure 2.3. 
This reasoning seems better because it does not differentiate between a digital or 
a non-digital technology. In other words, it can be applied to any technique of 
steganography regardless of the media used.
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Figure 2.3: Our classification on types of steganography.
The first type is steganography by cover exploitation. In this type of 
steganography, the technique will exploit the available properties of the cover. 
The real message is not embedded but correlates with the existing properties such 
as the letters, words and symbols that are available in the cover. An example of 
steganography in this category is null ciphers where certain letters like the first, 
second or third letter in each word successively yields the real message.
The second type is steganography by cover modiGcation. In this category, 
steganography modifies the existing properties of the cover and the real message 
embedded into the cover. It will modify either the medium  or the information 
available on the medium such as texts. The medium modiGcation examples include 
invisible ink which uses special ink to write the message and newspaper code that 
create marks such as small holes and dots on the medium. The bit substitution 
or addition is an example of steganography which modiGes the content of the 
medium.
The third category is steganography by cover creation. For this category, there 
is no cover available for the embedding process. The message itself is reformatted 
into a suitable form of cover for communication. The spammimic^ is one example 
of steganography that belongs to this category. It allows a short message to be
'h ttp  :/ / www. spammimic. com
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reformed as a typical spam message.
2.2.1 Steganography and Watermarking
Steganography forms part of a wider area of information hiding which covers a 
range of problems relating to the embedding of messages in multimedia contents 
[26]. As shown in Table 2.1, the existence of information hidden can be defined 
as imperceptible (overt) or secret (covert). This is one of the factors contributing 
to the difference of steganography which is more towards secret communication as 
compared to watermarking which focuses on content protection.
Table 2.1: Four categories of information hiding [26].
Cover Dependent Cover Independent
Message Message
Existence Covert Watermarking Steganography (Covert
Hidden Communication)
Existence Overt Watermarking Overt Embedded
Known Communications
In covert watermarking, users are unaware of the watermark. The example is 
when a printer prints its unique watermark that is invisible in each of their printed 
document. The watermark might contain the information such as the name of the 
printer, date of the printing and total number of pages. These allow the printer 
for the printed document to be traced.
For overt or visible watermarking, the printer would print a watermark tha t is 
visible on each of the document. One simple example is when we print a web 
page. Usually, the uniform resource locater (URL), the date and time of printing 
will be stated at the bottom of the printed document. Another example is when 
artists leave their names on each of their painting. In overt watermarking, users 
are usually aware of the watermark.
Another example in overt embedded communications is when we produce a 
document using a trial version software package. Usually the final document will 
contain a watermark stating the software package that was used to produce it. 
This watermark information is not related to the content of the document and 
imperceptible to the user.
Clearly, the main goal of steganography is to hide a message in such a way 
that an eavesdropper cannot detect the presence of the message while the main 
objective of watermarking is to hide a message in such a way that an eavesdropper 
cannot remove or replace it.
The term steganography has been somewhat misused for a different purpose. 
One example is when steganography commercial application was reported by BBC  
news^. From the report, the Japanese firm Fujitsu introduced a technology tha t 
can encode data into a picture invisible to the human eye and can be decoded by 
a mobile phone with a camera. Music clubs in Japan were the first to use the 
technology when they embedded the codes into leaflets sent out to subscribers.
^BBC News: Hiding messages in plain sight, h ttp ://n ew s.b b c .co .U k /l/h i/6 3 6 1 8 9 1 .stm
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Even though this commercial application is reported as steganography, 
this application can be considered to be watermarking or overt embedded 
communication rather than steganography since the existence of the secret 
communication is already known.
2.2.2 Media Types
The hiding of digital information within computer files is an example of modern 
implementation of information hiding. Examples include the hiding of information 
in audio by Gopalan [44] and video data by Noda et al. [92]. For image data, 
there are a number of examples, such as Outguess by Proves [103], F5 by Westfeld 
[130], and Yet Another Steganographic Scheme (YASS) by Solanki et al. [119].
There are an estimated 800 steganography tools available on-line, many of them 
free and with user-friendly graphical user interface^. This makes steganography 
more accessible and easier to use. For example, a search in Download, com^ using 
^steganography' as a keyword has returned four steganography software packages. 
From these four packages, two of them can be downloaded and used freely: Bound’s 
steganography and Xiao Steganography as shown in Figure 2.4.
Keywoid; |sur,<4< 
Message: This is Atnuddn s secret message
EncodInQ Cortptete!
(a) Dound’s Steganography
About
Add file lo image
Finished: Flies joined 
i The process has  finished.
I
(b) Xiao Steganography
Figure 2.4: Examples of freely available steganography software packages
An example of a commercial application for steganography is the Steganos 
Privacy Suite^. This software package allows users to hide files on their hard 
drive. In this software package, the file or folder can be hidden inside a graphic 
or a sound file.
^Article by Higgins, October, 2007, Research Shows Image-Based Threat on the Rise, 
Security DarkReading, Accessed on August 2011, h ttp  : //www. darkreading. co m /secu rity / 
en cryp tion /sh ow A rticle . jhtm l?articleID=208804788  
^Download.com web page: www. download. com
®Steganos GmbH: h ttp ://w w w .steganos.com /us/products/overview /
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2.2.3 The Embedding Domain
Referring to the discussion by Zheng et al. [139], data embedding in images 
can be categorised into two types: methods operating in the spatial domain and 
methods operating in the frequency domain. Take a process of embedding a 
message in an image as an example, methods working in the spatial domain store 
message bits directly into the pixel data of the host image. For Shih [116], spatial 
domain embedding has the advantages of low complexity and easy implementation 
but can be easily detected using computer analysis. This is why more recent 
steganographic algorithms are operating in the frequency domain.
For the frequency domain or transform domain method, the message data is 
hidden in the transform space of the image. The transform techniques can be 
applied to image blocks or to the whole image frame. Three main types of 
transform techniques are listed by Kipper [65]: The discrete cosine transform 
(DCT), discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and discrete wavelet transform (DWT). 
In addition, there are several transforms that could potentially be used to 
embed the hidden data, including the fast Hadamard transform (FHT) and Slant 
transform (ST).
DCT
DCT helps separate an image into several parts starting from the lower frequencies 
(where much of signal energy lies) to the higher frequencies. By using DCT an 
image is represented as a sum of sinusoids of different magnitudes and frequencies. 
In JPEC compression, DCT transforms successive 8 x 8  pixel blocks of an image 
into 64 DCT coefficients array.
Wong et al. [132] presented a novel Modf steganographic method using the 
DCT domain. In Modf a group of 2x2 spatially adjacent quantised DCT 
coefficients is selected as the valid message carrier. Visual comparisons show that 
the performance of Modj is comparable to other methods and it achieves the 
lowest ratio of detection against the feature based blind steganalyser by Fridrich 
[33].
A technique which uses the Alternating Current (AC) of the quantised DCT 
coefficients for the embedding process is presented in Leng et al. [71]. The 
technique has shown to be able to keep the minimum image frequency differences 
and to withstand the chi-square attack (% )^ statistical test [131] which is based 
on the statistics for pairs of values (POVs). More discussion on statistic will 
be given in Section 2.6.1.
One of the steganography algorithms discussed in this thesis, the F5, also 
embeds message bits into randomly-chosen DCT coefficients. Other image 
steganography algorithms that operate on DCT coefficients include JSteg and 
Outguess, are discussed further in this chapter. Since our work focuses on the DCT 
domain, we briefly mention the other embedding domains and their examples in 
Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: The Works on Frequency Domain Embedding 
Transform Examples of works
DWT
Secret messages were embedded in the high frequency 
coefficients of DWT by Shejul and Kulkarni [1 1 2 ] for 
steganography using biometrics.
FHT
• One of the earliest works in FHT was performed by Ho 
et al. [53]. They proposed a robust and efficient digital 
image watermarking algorithm using the FHT for the 
copyright protection of satellite images.
• Maity and Kundu [87] proposed a digital image 
watermarking scheme using the characteristics of the 
human visual system (HVS), FHT and statistical 
information measure.
_ _
• Zhao et al. [138] proposed a novel semi-fragile 
digital watermarking method based on ST for image 
authentication and self-restoration. The watermark bits 
are embedded into the middle frequency region of each 
block after applying SLT of the original image.
• Veeraswamy et al. [124] embedded their watermark in 
the ST domain by altering the transform coefficients.
2.3 JPEG Based Steganography
JPEG based steganograpy has become popular because of several reasons. One 
important reason is that JPEG is the de-facto standard for the transmission and 
retrieval of images across computer network and storage. Therefore, it is a natural 
format of choice to be used in steganography.
Another reason is the ability to manipulate the process of quantisation during 
the JPEG image compression. This makes it very difficult to differentiate between 
the effects introduced by the steganographic data or effects caused by lower-quality 
quantisation. This matter could destructively affect the overall performance of 
steganalysis.
JPEG
JPEG outlines the standard for photographic image compression. There is a 
selectable trade-off between image size and quality based on the amount of
12
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compression tha t can be controlled during the encoding process. Figure 2.5 shows 
how JPEG encoding works. JPEG encoding divides an image into 8 x 8  pixel blocks 
and calculates the DOT of each block [109]. By using a quantisation table, the 
quantisation process then rounds off the DOT coefficient value. This is the lossy 
stage of the JPEG encoding process. Following that, under an entropy coding 
process, the resulting data is further compressed with a lossless algorithm. This 
second step is the lossless stage of the JPEG encoding process.
JPEG compressed 
image
Source Image JPEG compression
8x8 block
Coding
Tabies
Quantization
Tables
Entropy
Coding
DCT Quantization
J  I
Lossy Non Lossy
Figure 2.5: JPEG encoding process.
JSTEG
JSteg by Upham [1 2 2 ] is an example of a steganographic method for JPEG images 
that can also be viewed as least significant bit (LSB) steganography as shown in 
Figure 2.6. According to Wayner [128], it is the first generation of programs 
designed to hide information in the JPEG image format. JSieg uses the result of 
the lossy stage from JPEG encoding process as shown in Figure 2.7.
Pixel V alues 
LSB
M essa g e  Bits 
N ew  LSB
250 240 243 247
11111010 11110000 11110011 11110111
1 0 0 1
11111011 11110000 11110010 11110111
251 240 242 247
Figure 2.6: LSB steganography. The LSBs are replaced by the message bits.
JSieg can be considered as the frequency domain version of Hide&Seek [8 8 ] 
which embeds the message data in the LSB of pixel values. For JSteg^ message bits 
are embedded in the LSB of the quantised DCT coefficients except for coefficients 
with values of ‘0’ and T ’ as shown in Figure 2.8. This technique has a good 
embedding capacity, which is up to 1 2 % of the cover image size [130].
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JPEG compressed 
image data /  
JSteg stego imageSource Image JPEG compression
block Coding
Tables
Quantization
Tables
Secret
Message
Entropy
CodingDCT Quantization
RGB to YCbCr 
Converter
Lossy
Y
Non Lossy
Figure 2.7: JSteg embedding algorithm between two stages in JPEG encoding.
Origineil Coefficient 5 0 0 2 3 -1 0 -3 0 1 -3
Binary of Coefficient 0101 0000 0000 0010 0011 1111 0000 1101 0000 0001 1101
M essage 0 skip skip 1 1 1 skip 0
Operation replace nothing nothing replace replace replace nothing replace
New Binary of 
Coefficient
0100 0000 0000 0011 0011 1111 0000 1100 0000 0001 1101
Final Result 4 0 0 3 3 -1 0 -2 0 1 -3
Figure 2.8: JSteg embedding example with message code ‘OHIO’.
Unfortunately, JSteg was found to introduce artifacts [131]. According to 
Wayner [128], the coefficients in JPEG compression would usually be distributed 
in accordance to the normal bell curve. However, JSieg embedding process caused 
many pairs of coefficients occur in equal proportions. This may alter the smooth 
curve and cause some deviations from the benchmark.
A significant number of attacks have been used to defeat JSteg^ such as 
attack [131] and generalised chi-square attack by Proves and Honeyman [105]. 
In addition, Lyu and Farid [82] developed a wavelet decomposition steganalysis 
technique which also showed to have defeated JSteg.
OutGuess
The OutGuess 0.1 steganographic algorithm was proposed by Proves [1 0 2 ] as a 
response to the attack. Compared to JSteg, OutGuess 0.1 is considered more 
secure since it works by replacing the LSB of randomly selected DCT coefficients 
with message data.
OutGuess 0.2 was introduced later by Proves and Honeyman [104]. The 
embedding process is the same as Outguess 0.1 but in addition, OutGuess 0.2 
modified selected unused coefficients. Changes or ‘corrections’ are made using 
these coefficients to ensure that the stego image histogram matches with its cover 
image. About half of the available coefficients are reserved by OutGuess 0.2 for 
this correction purpose. While this provides an advantage as discussed above, it
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actually reduces the embedding capacity by about a half [1 1 0 ].
From F3 to F5
F3 introduced by Westfeld [130] as an option for a more secure algorithm compared 
to JSteg and OutGuess 0.2. F3 embedding process differs in a few aspects. The 
F3 excludes only coefficients with the value of ‘0’ and does not exclude coefficients 
with value of ‘1’. Furthermore, in F3 the message bits are not directly embedded 
into the LSB of DCT coefficients. Instead, F3 will decrement the coefficient’s 
absolute value when its LSB does not match.
However, F3 algorithm causes the shrinkage problem when the decrement for 
absolute value of ‘1’ and ‘-1’ producing a ‘0’ as shown in Figure 2.9. This causes 
F3 to effectively embed more ’0’ than ’1 ’. In addition, F3 contributes statistical 
artifacts in the histogram because there are more odd than even coefficients.
Figure 2.9: F3 shrinkage.
To eliminate the shrinkage problem, FJ maps negative coefficients to the 
inverted steganographic values [130]. An example is shown in Figure 2 .1 0 , as 
follows:
• an even negative coefficient represents a steganographic one,
• an odd negative coefficient represents a steganographic zero,
• an even positive represents a steganographic zero (as before with Jsteg and 
F3), and
• an odd positive coefficient represents a steganographic one.
The above technique ensures the bit-fiips occur proportionally. As a result, the 
histogram of F4 stego image will appear to have an ordinary frequency distribution 
structure.
Improving F4, F5 was introduced by Westfeld with an objective to provide 
high steganographic embedding capacity without sacrificing security. In [131], 
test was developed to attack EzStego [8 6 ], JSteg, Steganos [49] and S-Tools [16] 
steganography systems. Learning from that attack, F5 was designed to embed 
message bits into randomly chosen DCT coefficients. This is the same as what 
happened for F4, but an extra advantage is that when F5 employed permutative 
straddling to equalise the spread of embedded data and matrix embedding to
15
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Original Coetllclent 9 0 0 2 3 -1 0 -3 0 1 -3
Binary of Coefficient 0101 0000 0000 0010 0011 1111 0000 1101 0000 0001 1101
Inverted LSB 1110 1100 1100
Message 0 sk*) skip 1 1 1 skip 1 skip 0 0
Operation 5-1 nottiing nothing 2-1 -1+1 nothing -3+1 nothing 1-1
Final Result 4 0 0 1 3 0 1 -2 0 0 -3
Issue shrinkage shrinkage
Figure 2.10: F4 embedding example with message code ’OHIO’.
minimise the number of changes. Accompanying F5 is a F5 software'^ that uses 
a Java runtime environment and allows data to be embedded into BMP, GIF or 
JPEG images.
2.4 Types of Steganalysis
There are major concerns as steganography can be used in an illegal way such 
as to conceal cyber crime activities together with the related evidence. This is 
one of the important reasons why research in steganalysis is highly warranted. 
Additionally, advances in steganalysis research will indirectly help to further 
improve the steganography algorithms. A good knowledge of steganalysis helps 
steganographers in designing secure steganography algorithms.
It is well known that the embedding process in steganography leaves statistical 
artifacts. These artifacts can be used in a steganalysis process to distinguish 
between stego and cover images. Based on work by Ker [60], steganalysis can be 
classified as:
• Binary steganalysis where only one steganography method is involved and 
it is known. The objective is to detect the presence of payload.
• Multi-class steganalysis where multiple steganography methods are involved. 
The aim is to determine which steganography method has been used to 
embed payload.
• Quantitative steganalysis where steganography method is known and the 
idea is to find the size of payload.
From [6 ], they classified steganalysis into specific steganalysis and universal 
steganalysis. In specific steganalysis, the use of steganography method is known 
and it answers the following question: Was the medium embedded with algorithm 
S?. In universal steganalysis, steganography method is unknown and it answers 
the following question: Is the medium a stego medium?. Once trained with a set 
of known steganographic algorithms in the training process, universal steganalysis 
allows the unknown or new algorithm to be detected [6 ].
Meanwhile, three types of steganalysis are listed by Cox et al. [26]:
Software, available at, http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/westfeld/f5.html
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Targeted steganalysis where the steganographic algorithm is known. 
The steganalysis method is designed for each individual steganographic 
algorithm. This helps by providing a powerful clue to choose the best 
steganalysis feature for each steganographic algorithm.
Blind steganalysis where steganographic algorithm being used is unknown. 
The steganalysis method does not assume any particular steganography 
algorithm and can usually break a variety of algorithms.
• Forensic steganalysis where steganographic algorithm is known and the 
communication that contains a hidden message can be reliably determined. 
The objective is to find other related information of the message.
Universal steganalysis in [6 ] and blind steganalysis in [26] are synonymous 
in the way they are defined. In both steganalysis types, the steganography 
algorithms are not limited to specific algorithms, but the implementation is much 
harder. This is because the steganalysis process still depends on the knowledge 
of steganography algorithms during the training stage. In the next section, we 
will discuss steganalysis classification within the context of the prisoner’s problem 
[117],
The Prisoner’s Problem For Steganalysis Classification
The prisoner’s problem was introduced by Simmons [117] to represent research on 
subliminal channels® for cryptography. In this section we categorise steganalysis 
techniques based on the different situations in the prisoner’s problem.
In the modern study of steganography, the two prisoners have been named 
Alice and Bob while the warden is Wendy or Eve [118]. Referring to Figure 2.11, 
the problem started when Alice and Bob have been arrested and placed in 
separate cells. They wish to plan an escape but they can only communicate 
by sending messages through a third party, agent of the warden; Wendy. They 
can communicate as long as the information contained in the message can be read 
by Wendy and they do not deal with escape plans. Alice and Bob are well aware 
of these facts, and are now going to communicate secretly by embedding hidden 
information into their innocent messages.
From Figure 2 .1 1 , we can see four situations of steganalysis based on the 
prisoner’s problem from the above discussion. The first situation is when Wendy 
knows what steganography algorithm is being used by Alice and Bob. The 
objective of steganalysis by Wendy is to determine whether the object shared 
by Alice and Bob contains a secret message or not. The knowledge about the 
steganography algorithm helps Wendy to differentiate between cover object or 
stego object. This situation can be categorised as targeted steganalysis as shown 
in Figure 2.12.
The second situation is when Wendy has a list o f possible steganography 
algorithms that is used by Alice and Bob. The problem is that she has no 
information about which steganography algorithm that was used by Alice and
^Subliminal channels enable covert communication which appear as a normal communication 
over an anxious channel.
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Bob 
Stego ObjectCover object
steganography 
Method
W endy PayloadPayload
Figure 2 .1 1 : Steganalysis with the prisoner’s problem example. Alice and Bob in 
separate cells. Wendy as the steganalyst.
Classifier
with
Input image information
? of
S
S' image
Not S’ image
Figure 2.12: Targeted Steganalysis.
Boh. In this case, the limitation on the information about the steganography 
algorithm used makes steganalysis more difficult. This second situation can be 
categorised as multi-class steganalysis as shown in Figure 2.13.
The situation becomes more difficult when Wendy has no knowledge about 
the steganography algorithm tentatively used by Alice and Bob (not in her 
steganography algorithm list). W hat Wendy can rely on is only the knowledge of 
how other steganography techniques works. This is known as blind steganalysis as 
illustrated in Figure 2.14.
The final situation is when Wendy is able to detect the stego object correctly 
and confidently know about the steganography algorithm used to create it. The 
objective of this steganalysis category is to find more information about the 
embedded message. Examples of possible attacks may include trying to determine 
the length of the message or even trying to read the message itself. Related to this 
type of steganalysis, the attempt to determine the stego key for steganography was 
presented by Fridrich et al. in [37].
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Figure 2.13: Multi-class Steganalysis.
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Figure 2.14: Blind Steganalysis.
2.5 Steganalysis Based on Embedding Domain
In Section 2.2.3 we have discussed the different embedding domains available for 
data embedding. The situation is similar for steganalysis where the steganalysis 
algorithms can be designed to work in a specific embedding domain. According 
to Cox et al. [26], blind steganalysis can be performed in two approaches; in the 
spatial domain and in the JPEG domain. A similar classification was found in the 
discussion by Shih [116], where steganalysis are categorised into two classes; the 
spatial domain steganalytic system and the frequency-domain steganalytic system.
Spatial Domain Steganalysis
Spatial domain steganalysis focuses on the statistical features of the spatial 
domain. Examples of spatial domain steganalysis include visual attack and 
steganalysis based on run length features proposed by Yu and Babaguchi [137]. 
Run length features are sensitive to LSB matching in spatial domain of images. 
However, not all spatial domain steganalysers are specific for spatial domain 
steganalysis. For example, even though the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) 
steganalysis features by Gul and Kurugollu [46] were extracted in the spatial 
domain, their steganalyser was shown to defeat frequency domain steganography 
techniques such as Outguess and F5.
Frequency Domain Steganalysis
For frequency domain steganalysis, statistical features are extracted in the 
frequency domain such as from the DCT coefficients of an image. Generally,
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most steganographic techniques for JPEG format manipulate the quantised DCT 
coefficients. This is why the features extracted from the frequency domain are 
more efficient than features calculated from the spatial domain for steganalysis of 
JPEG images. Examples of steganalysis technique working in this domain include 
image calibration by Fridrich [33], Markov process by Shi et a l [113] and wavelet 
statistics by Lyu and Farid [83]. These techniques will further be discussed in 
Section 3.3.
2.6 Early Steganalysis Methods
Regarded as the simplest method of steganalysis, visual attack exploits the naked 
eye in identifying any obvious artifacts in the suspected object. Even though 
steganography is able to minimise the effect on stego object, it is possible to 
separate the object into two parts; the part that is not used in embedding and the 
part that is used in embedding.
Let us take LSB embedding technique for an image as an example. Usually 
the most significant bits (MSB) of an image will be considered as the unaltered 
portion and the embedding only happens in LSB part. Rather than looking at 
the image itself, a steganalyser can now concentrate only on the LSB part which 
is more easier to observe for signs of manipulation.
In Figure 2.15, we can see the effect of LSB after a message is embedded using 
simple sequential LSB embedding. The visual attack works very well for this type 
of embedding technique, but it will become more difficult, for example when data 
are embedded in random locations. In addition, this technique is also considered 
prone to error since the process relies on human interaction and visual perception.
2.6.1 Statistical Attack
According to Papoulis and Pillai [93], statistics deals with the applications of 
theory to real world problems based on observations. They also stated that 
statistics consists of two parts:
• Analysis or mathematical statistics that mainly involves repeated trials and 
events of probability which is close to 0  or 1 .
• Design or applied statistics which deals with data collection and design of 
experiment.
In steganalysis, statistical attack is a mathematical approach at identifying signs 
of embedding. The following discussion discusses how statistics has been used for 
steganalysis approaches.
Chi-squared (%^ ) Attack
The technique was proposed by Westfeld [131]. It is one of the first general 
steganalytic methods which performs well on steganographic algorithms th a t use 
sequential LSB embedding.
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(a) (b)
The goal o f steganalysis Is to identify suspected packages, 
determine whether or not they have a payload encoded into 
them, and, if possible, recover that payload. Unlike 
cryptanalysis, where It is obvious that intercepted data 
contains a message (though that message is encrypted), 
steganaiysis generally starts with a pile of suspect data files, 
but little Information about which of the files, If any, contain a 
payload. The steganalyst usually something of a forensic 
statistician, and must start by reducing this set of data files 
(which is often quite large; in many cases, it may be the 
entire set o f files on a computer) to the subset most likely to 
have been altered.
(c)
(d) (e)
Figure 2.15: (a) Original image (Courtesy of the Signal and Image Processing Institute 
at the University of Southern California) (b) Stego image after embedded 
with message (c) Message embedded (d) LSB plane of original image (e) 
LSB plane of stego image.
attack is based on statistics for pairs of values (POVs). POVs are created 
when sequential embedding on least significant bits transforms values into each 
other and the difference is only on the least significant bit. Referring to Figure 2.16, 
let us consider the pixel value =  2. If the pixels are embedded with the stream of 
message (0 or 1) using a LSB technique, two possible results can be obtained. First, 
if the LSB is replaced by 0, the pixel value will remain at 2 and if LSB is replaced by 
1, the pixel value will increase to 3. Let us consider another pixel with value =  3. 
If the LSB is replaced by 0, the pixel value will decrease to 2 and if LSB is replaced 
by 1 , the pixel value remains at 3. This example shows how the two pixels values 
can be changed into each other. This is true for all odd and even values. For a 
8 -bit grayscale image, the POVs will be {0 <#> 1,2 3,..., 252 <=> 253,254 255}.
This will affect the histogram of image’s pixels with the related POVs values but 
it does not change the sum of those two pixels.
The idea of attack is to compare the expected frequency distribution in
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Embed 0
Embed 1
Figure 2.16: Transformation of values into each other in POV when LSB of an 
overwritten with message bit stream.
stego image with sample distribution observed in the cover medium. The level 
of similarity between those two distributions is a measure of the possibility for 
the embedding to occur. This method can be applied not only in the spatial 
domain, but it can also be implemented on the DCT coefficients as the embedding 
algorithm will also work in JPEG domain.
attack has shown to work on sequential embedding approaches such as in 
EzStego steganography utilities. Unfortunately, several steganographic algorithms 
have been developed to enable data embedded at random locations. To cater for 
this random location embedding approach, the attack has been generalised. 
This approach has been proposed by Proves and Honeyman [105]. The generalised 
X^  is different from x^ attack as it keeps a constant sample size and changes the 
starting position for each measurement.
Histogram Attack
For JPEG domain, the DCT coefficients of a stego image can be extracted and 
displayed based on their frequencies of occurrence or histogram. Histogram attack 
works on JPEG sequential and pseudo-random embedding type of steganography. 
It looks at the loss of histogram symmetry after embedding. Figure 2.17 shows the 
differences on the histogram for a cover image and its corresponding stego image 
produced by using JSteg.
2.7 Summary
This chapter has presented an introduction for the terms or approaches related 
to embedding process. The different types of steganography were discussed. A 
number of different algorithms in steganography were presented included JSteg, 
Outguess and F5. Some approaches were shown to focus on maximising the 
embedding capacity while some approaches in contrast focused on the security 
of the algorithm by minimising the message embedding capacity. This chapter 
has also provided a discussion on steganalysis. It highlighted the different 
steganalysis approaches based on situations of the prisoner’s problem such as 
targeted steganalysis., multi-class steganalysis and blind steganalysis. Some of the
2.7. Summary
early published steganalysis techniques like and histogram attacks were also 
included. The next chapter discusses the statistical steganalysis techniques which 
include machine learning in their approaches.
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(a)
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(c)
Figure 2.17: (a)The original clean image (b)The histogram of DCT coefficients for 
clean JPEG image, (c) The histogram of DCT coefficients for the 
corresponding stego image produced using JSteg.
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3 M achine Learning in 
Steganalysis
The previous chapters discussed briefly the concepts of steganography and 
steganalysis. This chapter will look at the different approaches proposed or used 
in the steganalysis techniques based on machine learning.
The discussion in Section 3.1 starts with an introduction to the phases and 
instances in machine learning based steganalysis. The discussion also includes 
the differences in the steganalysis experimental setup. One of the reasons for 
the differences in experimental setup are caused by the different image sources, 
is discussed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 then presents Wavelet Features, D CT  
Features and Markov Features as examples of the statistical features used in 
steganalysis.
In Section 3.4, we investigate two types of classification in steganalysis; the 
binary classification and multi-class classification. These classifications can be 
performed by using classifiers such as the Support Vector Machine (SVM) which 
will be discussed in Section 3.4.1. Furthermore, Section 3.5 gives some examples 
of performance heuristics used in the evaluation of the classifier’s performance 
and also discusses confidence interval as an additional parameter to support the 
predicted classifier’s performance.
3.1 Phases In Machine Learning Based 
Steganalysis
Most of the published steganalysis techniques such as in [101, 61,127] are based on 
machine learning. Machine learning tries to provide a system which is able to learn 
from the observed data. The adaptivity of machine learning allows it to repeat 
the task more effectively. This is possible because machine learning can change 
their behavior towards a better decision making process based on its observation.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a typical machine learning based steganalysis system while 
Table 3.1 lists the data instances involved in the process. Each phase will be 
discussed in more details as follows;
Object selection
This is a decision task. The cover image set to be used will be selected from the 
available image sources. It could be from the online databases or the own captured 
images. Chapter 4 will look at how this initial step affects the steganalysis results.
Object prepciration
This phase can be considered as optional. For example, the selected images might
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Figure 3.1: Steganalysis and machine learning: from image selection to
classification
be of the same size or different sizes. It can also be in colour or grayscale. In 
this phase, if same size images are needed, then the images will be resized. If 
grayscale images are preferred, then colour images will be converted to grayscale 
images.
Payload em bedding
In this phase, the payload will be embedded in the cover image. A decision 
needs to be made on which embedding algorithms to use especially in a blind 
steganalysis approach. W hat kind of payload to be embedded also needs to be 
decided. Payload may be random bits or structured data such as an image. The 
output of this phase is the stego image.
Classification feature extraction
The features for classification need to be extracted. Features help to characterise 
similar images into the same category. The features for training and testing 
images will be the output of this phase. More discussion on types of features will 
be discussed in Section 3.3.
Scaling
Scaling ensures the features in smaller numeric range not dominated by features 
in greater numerical ranges. This process also helps to reduce the complexity 
during calculation.
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Table 3.1: The description of data instances involved in machine learning based 
steganalysis
Data Instance Description
Cover object The processed object ready for embedding process
Payload Data or information to be embeded
Stego Object Output of embedding process which is the cover 
object containing the payload
Training File Cover and stego objects for training purpose
Testing File Cover and stego objects for testing purpose. This 
file is not included in the training file
Training Features Classification features extracted from training file
Testing Features Classification features extracted from testing file
Classification The parameters corresponding to training features
Parameters which provide the best classification performance
Model The output of training process. It represents the 
features as points in space, separated and clearly 
divided into categories
Performance The evaluation or assessment of classification
Heuristic performance
Param eter Selection
This is the phase where the classifier will be trained iteratively to obtain the 
optimum parameters for the best classification performance.
Classifier training
The classifier will be trained with features from the training set. The output of 
this training process is the classification model which will be used to classify the 
test images in the next phase.
Classifier testing
This final phase will provide the indicator for the performance of the steganalysis 
process. Using classification model as an input, test images will be grouped 
based on their constructed features. The performance heuristic as discussed in 
Section 3.5 is the output of this phase.
3.1.1 Experimental Design
Section 3.1 has discussed the phases and data instances in machine learning 
implementation for steganalysis. There are a few factors which contribute to the 
differences in the experimental setup such as the image source, statistical features 
and classifier used. Table 3.2 shows the different image steganalysis experimental 
setups found in the literature. In particular, we can see the differences in term 
of the images source, total number of images, the size of the image and the file 
format of the image.
The experimental setup is crucial in steganalysis research. The design of the
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Table 3.2: Steganalysis setup, from image source to image preparation process
Paper Image source Total
image
used
Image size 
(pixels)
Additional info
[36] Own 2 0 469x625 to 
1336x1782
Grayscale, BMP
[29] Philip Greenspun 500 1000x1400
[82] Philip Greenspun 1800 1640x480 Cropped (center)
[83] FreeFoto.com 40,000 600x400 JPEG, QF of 90
[33] Philip Greenspun 1814 780x540 Grayscale, cropped, 
QF of 80
[135] CorelDraw 1096 n /a
[5] Philip Greenspun 1800 n /a Grayscale, 
recompressed, 
QF of 75
[115] GorelDRAW 1096 n /a
[2 1 ] Own and online 7560 768x512 or 
512x768
[136] CorelDraw 1096 768x512 BMP
[98] Own 6000 n /a RAW
[113] Own and online 7560 768x512 or 
512x768
Cropped (center)
[1 0 0 ] Own 5900 n /a RAW
[1 0 1 ] Own 6006 800x631 to 
3008x2000
TIFF
[47] UCID 1 0 0 0 256x256 Grayscale
[1 2 0 ] UCID 1 0 0 0 352x512 or 
512x352
Grayscale
[81] UCID 1338 n /a Grayscale
[28] UCID 1338 512x384 or 
384x512
Grayscale, JPEG, 
QF of 75
[95] BOWS', own, 
NRGS
1338 512x384 or 
384x512
Grayscale, JPEG, 
QF of 75
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experiment will affect the final outcomes of the research. For example, it was 
mentioned by Xia et al. [133] and Pevny et al. [95] that the uncompressed images 
made steganalysis more challenging in the spatial domain such as an attack on 
LSB matching due to the large number of random noise in it.
Furthermore, the scope of the steganalysis features is also important in the 
design of a steganalysis method. It was found that there was a difference between 
steganalysis features for targeted steganalysis as compared to blind steganalysis 
[6 8 ]. The features in targeted steganalysis are related to specific embedding 
changes in stego images similar to what happened in a attack. However, 
for blind steganalysis, the features have a broader role as they include the 
descriptions of both cover and stego objects. This is essential since the capability 
of distinguishing the differences between the cover and stego object features will 
eventually determine the resultant steganalysis performance. Examples include 
the calibrated features calculated from the luminance component of JPEG images 
as discussed by Pevny and Fridrich [99], features based on multidirectional 
correlations of the quantised DCT coefficients by Wang et al. [127] and features 
from neighbouring joint density of DCT coefficients by Liu et al. [75].
In the next section we will provide an overview of the different data instances 
and processes in experimental setups found in the literature. In particular, 
the discussions focus on the variations in image sources, statistical features and 
classifiers as well as the performance evaluations of the classifier.
3.2 Image Source
For steganalysis, there is a need to obtain a large number of images especially 
when the machine learning based approaches are considered. A large variety of 
images should be used to cover all possibilities in term of scene, size and format. 
We found that there are a number of image databases available for steganaysis 
and image forensic research. Examples of the databases are listed in Table 3.3.
Many researchers from different groups usually used different sources of images. 
For examples, own captures images were used by Pevny et al. in [97, 99, 98], 
images from FreeFoto.com were used by Lyu et al. in [83, 84] and images from 
CorelDraw were used by Shi et al. in [115, 114, 136]. The different image sources 
used by different groups of researchers might be due to several reasons. It might 
be caused by the unavailability of the image source or the type of images was 
not suitable for the specific requirements of different groups. For example, the 
uncompressed images from CorelDRAW  provide good samples due to variability 
of images types, but it is not easily accessible by other researchers.
Databases that are available online can help to solve the accessibility problem 
but there is an issue related to images that have been processed such as 
compressed and cropped beforehand. Image databases such as Philip Creenspun, 
FreeFoto.com and NRCS could be exposed to pre-processing which might affect 
the overall steganalysis performance.
The best solution is to have publicly available databases providing images that 
are free from any pre-processing. One such solution is to use the UCID database. 
The easy access to UCID and its images that are free from any pre-processing
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Table 3.3: Examples of image databases that have been used for steganalysis
Database Description
Philip Collection of images from Philip Greenspun’s personal
Creenspun page. Available at h ttp ://p h ilip .g re e n sp u n .c o m / 
[45].
USC-SIPI The University of Southern California - Signal and 
Image Processing Institute Image Database image 
maintained primarily to support research in image 
processing, image analysis, and machine vision. 
Available at h t tp  : / / s i p i  .u se . edu /d a tab ase / [1]
Cround Image database from the Department of Computer
Truth Science and Engineering, University of Washington. 
Available at h ttp ://w w w .cs.w ash ing ton .edu / 
resea rch /im ag ed a tab ase /g ro u n d tru th / [2 ]
CorelDraw Images from CorelDraw cd’s.
B0WS2 Break Our Watermarking System (BOWS). This 
database was used during the BOWS Second Edition 
contest. Accessible at h ttp ://b o w s 2 .g ip s a - la b . 
in p g .f r  [8 ]
NRCS National Resource Conservation Services (NRCS) Photo
Gallery. This gallery contains natural resource and 
conservation related photos from across the USA. 
Accessible at h ttp :/ /p h o to g a l le ry .n rc s .u s d a .g o v /
_______________ |3j____________________________________________________
UCID Uncompressed Color Image Database (UCID). This
database provide images which were captured and 
are available in uncompressed form. The current
version (v2 ), contains 1338 images. Available at
h t tp  : / /w w w -staff. Ib o ro . a c .u k /" c o g s /d a ta se ts / 
UCID/ucid.html [111].
FreeFoto.com FreeFoto.com is the collection of free photographs and 
available at h ttp ://w w w .free fo to .co m /in d ex .jsp  
Dresden Available at h t tp : / / f o r e n s ic s . in f . tu - d r e s d e n .d e /
Image dresden_im age.database / [41]
Database
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provide a good choice of image samples. For instance, this can be seen in [73], 
where images from the UCID database were first compressed in order to obtain 
the single compressed JPEG cover images.
3.3 Statistical Features for Machine Learning 
Based Steganalysis
Machine learning based steganalysis approaches utilise statistical features to 
improve human subjective interpretation in visual attacks as already discussed 
in Section 2.6. The statistical features extracted from each image are used to 
train the classifier which later is evaluated for its performance in distinguishing 
the clean and stego images. The following discussion will focus on some examples 
of existing statistical features in steganalysis research [29] [36] [113].
W avelet Features
Wavelet Features initially proposed by Farid [29], was a statistical model based on 
first and higher order magnitude statistics of an image. The Wavelet Features 
were extracted from a wavelet decomposition of the image. The image was 
firstly decomposed into wavelet subbands before the statistics consisting of mean, 
median, kurtosis and skewness were then extracted for each sub-bands. A total 
of 72 Wavelet Features were extracted from each image. This initial work 
demonstrated how Wavelet Features could be used to detect steganography in 
grayscale JPEG, GIF and TIFF images. The maximum classification accuracy 
of 94.0% and 92.3% were achieved for test images from JSteg and OutGuess^ 
respectively. Unfortunately, the classification accuracies of 45.3% and 42.3% were 
below the random guessing^ (50%) for GIF and TIFF  test images created using 
EzStego and LSB embedding algorithm, respectively. More discussion on random 
guessing can be found in Section 3.5.1.
Wavelet Features have been extended to exploit statistics of colour images by 
Lyu and Farid [83]. A total of 72 Wavelet Features were extracted from each 
colour band contributing to a total of 216 Wavelet Features from each image. 
Steganography algorithms such as JSteg, Outguess and F5 have shown to be 
defeated by these extended Wavelet Features [83].
The latest version of Wavelet Features extension was presented by Lyu and Farid 
in [84]. Doubling the total number of features to 432 from 216 in [83], their work 
focused on detecting JPEG hiding methods together with LSB hiding on TIFF 
images. Wavelet Features were shown to be reliable in detection of stego images 
when the message embedded were large than 78% of the embedding capacity. 
Their results showed that JSteg stego images were the easiest to be detected while 
F5 stego images were the hardest.
^Random guessing represents the strategy of 50-50 random guess, for example the flipping 
coins.
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D C T Features
A steganalysis technique based on estimation of the cover image histogram from 
the stego image to counter the F5 steganography method was proposed by Fridrich 
et al [36]. This method known as calibration, decompressed the stego image, 
cropping four pixels in the horizontal and vertical directions and then recompressed 
it using the same quality factor as the stego image. It claimed that the statistical 
properties of the calibrated stego image were very similar to the cover image. The 
same method was further extended to attack Outguess [35].
The use of D CT Features was proposed in by Fridrich [33] for attacking JPEG 
steganography techniques such as F5 and Outguess. A total of 23 D CT Features 
were obtained as the L\ norm of the difference between the stego image and 
calibrated stego image. The performance of the proposed D CT Features was very 
good with the detection reliabilities^ of 0.96, 0.99 and 0.70 for F5, Outguess and 
MB  [110], respectively.
The use of DOT Features was extended by Pevny and Fridrich [97] for 
multi-class blind steganalysis of JPEG images. Their work focused on stego image 
classification based on steganographic technique used to create that stego image. 
The stego images using F5, MB and Outguess were correctly classified at an 
average detection rate of 99.01%.
Markov Features
In [113], a novel steganalysis technique based on the Markov process to attack 
JPEG steganography was proposed by Shi et al. The technique worked by 
modelling the differences between absolute values of neighbouring JPEG coefficient 
arrays (Definition 1) as a Markov process. The JPEG coefficients were arranged 
in the same way as the pixels in the image by replacing 8 x 8  block of pixels with 
corresponding block of DCT coefficient.
Definition 1. The JPEG coefficient array consists of all the JPEG coefficients which have 
been quantised with JPEG quantisation table but have not been zig-zag scanned, run-length 
coded and Huffman coded from the JPEG encoding process.
To utilise the second order statistics for steganalysis, a Markov process was 
applied to model the difference of JPEG coefficient arrays along horizontal, 
vertical and diagonal directions. To reduce the feature vector dimensionality, the 
thresholding (Definition 2) was applied in this technique. Thresholding greatly 
reduces the dimensionality of transition probability matrices which then contribute 
to smaller dimensions of feature vectors and reduces the computational complexity 
in the approach. Using a threshold value of 4, an output of 324 features known as 
Markov Features were produced.
Definition 2. In thresholding, the values smaller than threshold value T, will be represent by  
-T  and values bigger than T will be represent by T.
In their work, Shi et a l demonstrated that Markov Features outperformed 
Wavelet Features and D CT Features [113],. For Outguess, Markov Features 
achieved an accuracy of 97.5% as compared to 91.8% by D CT Features and 78.6%
^Discussed in Section 3.5
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for Wavelet Features. Moreover, in F5 case, Markov Features achieved an accuracy 
of 96.8% as compared to 92.8% by DCT Features and 63.9% for Wavelet Features
Following that, Pevny and Fridrich [100] integrated Markov Features with 
their DCT Features [33]. In their work, the 23 D CT Features were extended 
to 193 features and Markov Features were reduced to 81 features before both 
were combined to produce a total of 274 DCT-Markov Features. More details 
on the extended D CT Features and reduced Markov Features are discussed in 
Section 5.3.2. These hybrid features achieved a better performance as compared 
to when they were used individually. Detection accuracy for Outguess, MB and 
Steghide^ achieved 100% while for F5 and Hide&Seek"^ [8 8 ], the accuracies were 
both above 99%.
In [113], for the original Markov Features, only the relation of neighbouring for 
intra-block 8 x 8  JPEG coefficients were considered. In fact, it was realised by Liu 
et al. [76] that the relation of neighbouring could also be possible for inter-block 
JPEG coefficients. Liu et al. further extended the Markov Features to consider 
the inter-blocks of 8  x 8  JPEG coefficients. As a result, improvements of 4% for 
F5 and 9% for Steghide in classification accuray were achieved in their multi-class 
JPEG steganalysis. Multi-class steganalysis will be discussed in Section 3.4.
3.4 The Classifier in Machine Learning
We have discussed several examples of statistical features for steganalysis in 
Section 3.3. After the steganalysis features have been extracted, the next phase 
in machine learning based steganalysis is to train the classifier.
The first step in the training phase is to select the classifier. This is important 
since how a classifier operates will affect the steganalysis performance such as 
computational intensity as well as the final result. It has been demonstrated by 
Lyu and Farid [82], that the Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier can provide 
better results as compared to the Fisher Linear Discriminant (FLD) classifier 
when trained with the Wavelet Features. More information on SVM  and FLD are 
presented later in this section.
To continue the discussion, the operation of two different classifications based 
on the total number of classes associated with these classifications are presented 
as follows:
Binary classification:
Referring to discussion by Montejo-Raez et al. [89], the binary classification goal is 
to assign a given set of objects to one of two possible classes as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The classification is based on whether the objects contain the same property or not. 
For example in steganalysis, when an image is tested for either having a message 
embedded or not. Binary classification was implemented by Fridrich et al. in 
[36] and [35] while attacking F5 and Outguess, respectively. Furthermore, binary
^Steghide is a steganography program that is able to hide data in various kinds of image and 
audio files and available from: h ttp : / /s te g h id e .s o u r c e fo r g e .n e t / .
“^ Hide and Seek 4.1 is a free software which embeds data in LSB of GIF image files.
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classification was implemented by Liu et al. [75] based on Neighbouring Joint 
Density Features to attack F5, MB, and Steghide. The results were comparable 
to the Markov Features in term of detection accuracy performance.
O g Q
Classifier
O e C
Figure 3.2: Binary classification: Object is classified as belongs to either class
Multi-class classification:
According to Aiolli and Sperduti [4], in multi-class classification, given a set of 
unseen objects, the multi-class classification will try  to map the objects to their 
appropriate classes. Multi-class classification is more difficult as compared to 
binary classification as it allows categorization for more than two classes as shown 
in Figure 3.3. For example, multi-class classification can be applied to stego 
images according to different steganography algorithms used to hide messages. 
Under this classification, works by Pevny and Fridrichin [99] achieved the highest 
accuracy of 99.08% for Outguess and the lowest accuracy of 93.53% for Steghide 
in classification of F5, Outguess, MB, Steghide and Hide&Seek stego images. In 
addition, Wang et al. [126] demonstarted multi-class classification was effective 
in grouping the stego images of Jsteg, F5, Outguess and MB  with accuracies of 
more than 90%. Moreover, Fridrich [34] stated that multi-class classification is 
actually a first step towards forensic steganalysis as we have discussed previously 
in Section 2.4.
O eC,
O e CMulti Class 
Classifier
OeC,
Figure 3.3: Multi-class classification: Object is classified as belong to one of the 
classes
3.4.1 Variation of Classifier
The classification, either binary or multi-class, can be performed by using a 
machine learning tool; a classifier. The following discussion will present an 
introduction to some classifiers that have been used in steganalysis.
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Neural Network (NN)
Based on the neural structure of the brain, N N  is an adaptive system that modifies 
its structure based on information that fiows through the network. It learns by 
comparing the classification with known actual classification of the data. Any error 
introduced will be used to modify the network algorithm for the next iteration or 
new data. An early work of steganalysis using NN  model for steganalysis was 
performed by Liu et al. [77]. In their work, NN  was used to perform binary 
classification in attacking quantisation index modulation{QIM) steganography 
method [20] achieving a detection rate of 85.4%.
A prototype of a steganalysis software system using NN was developed by 
Davidson et al. [27]. Regardless of the embedding algorithm types, their stego 
detector software achieved a detection rate of 91.5%. Recent example of NN  
implementation in steganalysis was demonstrated by Holoska et al. [54]. In their 
work, N N  was shown to perform much better than a linear classification tool, 
Stegdetect^. Specifically, the maximum total error rate for N N  was 0.5% while 
for linear classification {Stegdetect) the minimal rate was 2 .2 % and maximal was 
7.5%.
Fisher Linear Discriminant (FLD)
FLD was introduced by Fisher in [32]. It is a classification method that 
projects high-dimensional data onto a line and performs classification in the 
one-dimensional sub-space. This sub-space is called the discriminant [50]. The 
projection maximises the distance between the means of the two classes while 
minimising the variance within each class as shown in Figure 3.4. This defines the 
Fisher criterion, which is maximised over all linear projections, w:
* 1  “T  « 2
where m represents a mean, s  ^ represents a variance, and the subscripts denote 
the two classes.
In steganalysis, the earliest example of FLD implementation using Wavelet 
Features was introduced by Farid in [29]. Next, FLD was used by Fridrich [33] 
when D CT Features introduced for steganalysis of JPEG images.
Binary classification using FLD was implemented by Harmsen and Pearlman in 
[50] to attack F5. In their work, the FLD was trained with features extracted from 
DCT coefficients of the JPEG images. The FLD was shown to produce excellent 
results, even at the lowest of 1 0 % embedding rate, the detection rate achieved was 
above 97.5%.
In [107], Ramezani and Ghaemmaghami compared FLD with other classifiers 
provided by the Statistical Pattern Recognition Toolbox (STPRtool)® such as 
Gaussian Naive Bayes and K  Nearest Neighbour. After training with Wavelet
^Stegdetect is an automated tool for detection of steganographic content in images. Developed 
by Niels Proves and available from:http://w w w .o u tg u ess .o rg /d etec tio n .p h p .
^Statistical Pattern Recognition Toolbox for MATLAB (STPRtool), available at h ttp : //c m p . 
f e l k . cv u t. cz/cm p/cm p_software.htm l.
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Figure 3.4: FLD: projection from two dimensional into one dimensional to 
maximise the distance between means and minimise variance between 
classes. Image adapted from [13]
Features, FLD provided the best results amongst the compared classifiers with 
13.82% mean classification error [107].
Support Vector Machines (SVM)
In addition to N N  and FLD classifiers, another well known classifier is the SVM. 
SVM  uses a separating hyperplane (Definition 3) to form a classifier with a 
maximal margin [125].
Definition 3. The separating hyperplane is a subspace of dimension n — 1 that splits an 
n-dimensional space. For example, hyperplane is a point in one-dimensional space, a line in 
two-dimensional space and a plane in three-dimensional space.
SVM  views input data as two sets of vectors in an n-dimensional space. SVM  
will construct an optimal separating hyper plane in the space, which maximises the 
margin between the two data sets. The capability to mapping the original data 
to the kernel space is an advantage of SVM  since it can treat a nonlinear learning 
problem as a linear learning problem.
As illustrated in Figure 3.5, any hyperplane can be represented as the set of 
points X  satisfying
w • X  — 6 =  0, (3.2)
where • denotes the dot product. The vector w  is a normal vector perpendicular 
to the hyperplane.
SVM  will choose the w and b to maximise the distance between the parallel
hyperplanes while still separating the data. These hyperplanes can be described
by the equations
w • X  -  5 =  1 (3.3)
and
w - x - 6  =  —1. (3.4)
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Support V ectors
W*X-b = l
W#X-b = 0
Figure 3.5: Operating mode of a SVM. Image adapted from [72]
For linearly separable data, the distance between the two hyperplanes is | |^ .  
To maximise the distance, ||w|| will be minimised. For non-linear classifiers, every 
dot product is replaced by a non-linear kernel function. The training vector Xi is 
mapped into a higher dimensional space by the function (f) (Figure 3.6). Following 
that, SVM  finds a linear separating hyperplane with the maximal margin in 
this higher dimensional space. K{xi,Xj) = (f){xi)^(f){xj) is known as the kernel 
function. There are four basic kernels in SVM  namely as follows:
Linear:
Polynomial:
K{Xi,Xj) =  XTXi.
K{Xi,Xj) =  {'iXrXj + r y , ' r > 0 .
• Radial Basis Function (REF):
K(Xi, Xj) = exp (-7 ||X i -  X£) , 7 > 0.
•  Sigmoid:
K{Xi, Xj) =  tanh {^-yXfXj +  r) .
(3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
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200
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Figure 3.6: 0 mapping the training vector Xi into higher dimensional space. Image 
adapted from [79].
Where 7 , r  and à are the kernel parameters.
In steganalysis, SVM  has been employed as a binary and multi-class classifier. 
As a binary classifier, SVM  is commonly used to categorise an image as either 
clean or stego based on the image’s statistical features as shown in Figure 3.7. 
Furthermore, by using the same image’s statistical features, a multi-class S VM  is 
commonly used to categorise the detected stego images according to steganography 
algorithm used to embed the message.
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 ... 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature 2  ... 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 ... 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature 2 ...
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 ...
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature 2 ...
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 ...
Training S e t
Training Classification
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eatu re  2  . 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature  2  . 
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature  2 . 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature  2 .
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature  2 . 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eatu re  2 
1 1 .Feature 1 Feature  2 .
Testing C lassification  R esu lt
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 .. 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 .. 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2 .. 
-1 1 f e a tu r e  1 F eature 2  ..
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature  2 
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature 2 
1 1 f e a tu r e  1 Feature 2
T est S e t
Figure 3.7: S VM  binary classification process. In any given training and testing 
set, each individual instance has a class label value (for example 1 or 
-1 ) and several features attributes
There are a number of examples of S VM  implementation in steganalysis. An 
early example of SVM  implementation in steganalysis was introduced by Lyu
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and Farid in [82]. In their work, they replaced the FLD classifier used in 
[29] with the SVM. Three classes of SVM  were employed; the linear separable, 
linear non-separable and non-linear. It was found that SVM  provided the better 
classification accuracy. For EzStego, the classification accuracy increased from 
random guessing (50%) to 77.2% using fiexible non-linear SVM. There were also 
5% and 2 1 % improvements in the classification accuracy for JSteg and Outguess, 
respectively. Lyu and Farid again used SVM  for their blind steganalyser based on 
Wavelet Features in [83] and [84].
In term of performance, it was shown by Ker [61] that SVM  was more efficient 
as compared to FLD and NN. In his work, the Wavelet Absolute Moment (WAM) 
steganalysis was implemented on nine different image sets such as colour and 
grayscale digital camera images, scanned images and photo library CD images. 
From the results of pre-processed colour digital camera image set, SVM  achieved 
the highest classification accuracy of 75% as compared to 73% for N N  and 69% 
for FLD.
The following discussion presents some examples of SVM  software tools which 
have been used in steganalysis research. Three software packages for SVM  will 
be highlighted, namely Gist, SVMLight and LibSVM. Gist is an example of SVM  
packages which can be accessed online, SVMLight represents the standalone SVM  
package, while LibSVM  is the most favorite SVM  package among the steganalysis 
researchers. More details of these SVM  packages are as follows:
Gist
Gist [91] contains software tools for SVM  classification and for kernel principal 
components analysis. It was written by William Stafford Noble in the Department 
of Computer Science at Columbia University and by Paul Pavlidis in the Columbia 
Genome Center. The current version of Gist is 2.3 and the SVM  portion of 
Gist is available via an interactive web server h t tp : / /s v m .s d s c .e d u /c g i-b in /  
nph-SVMsubmit. cgi. Gist is easy to use, users just have to prepare the training 
and testing data, upload it into the application and the classification’s result will 
be produced (results will remain on the server for three days). However, there are 
some limitations, since it is a web based application, a very large or long-running 
jobs sometimes cannot be run. This is due to the limited number of supported 
concurrent or waiting jobs in the application. In addition. Gist only support 
binary classification.
SVMLight
SVMLight [56] is an implementation of Vapnik’s SVM  [123] for solving problems 
related to pattern recognition, regression and a ranking function. The current 
version of SVMLight is V 6.02 which can be downloaded from h t tp : / / s v m l ig h t . 
joach im s.o rg /. SVMLight is a standalone application, so there is no such issue 
like the unsupported long-running jobs as happened in web based Gist. However, 
multi-class classification is not supported by the SVMLight package.
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LibSVM
LibSVM  [18] is a library for SVM. The latest version is 3.1 which was released 
on April, 2011. LibSVM  was created so that users can easily use SVM  as a 
tool. The LibSVM  package can be downloaded from h ttp ://w w w .c s ie .n tu . 
e d u .tw /~ c jlin /lib sv m /. To optimise the classifier performance, some tools 
are provided in LibSVM  package. Tools such as scale.py can be used to scale 
the classification features, while the grid.py can be used to determine the best 
classification parameters. Table 3.4 lists some of the tools available in LibSVM  
package. One major advantage of LibSVM  over Gist and SVMLight is the support 
of multi-class classification.
Table 3.4: The tools from LibSVM  package
Function Description
grid Parameter selection.
svm-scale Scaling the features.
svm-train Train the classifier with training’s features set.
svm-predict Prediction of the testing’s data set.
easy Perform everything, from data scaling to
parameter selection.
plot Plot the ROC and calculate AUC value.
3.5 Evaluating a Classifier System
The performance of classifier must be measured to ensure its effectiveness. Let 
us consider the binary classification problems in steganalysis. For example from 
discussion by Fawcett [30], if the classification instance is positive (stego image):
• and it is classified as positive, it is counted as a true positive or hit
• and if it is classified as negative (non-stego image), it is counted as a false 
negative or miss.
If the instance is negative;
• and it is classified as negative, it is counted as a true negative or correct 
rejection
•  and if it is classified as positive, it is counted as a false positive or false 
alarm.
By referring to Figure 3.8, several common metrics can be calculated as below: 
True Positive Rate (Recall or Sensitivity)
^ u e  Positive Rate =  (3.9)
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T rue C la ss  
pos neg
YES True
Positives
False
Positives
Hypothesized
C lass
NO False True
Negatives Negatives
Figure 3.8: Classification matrix is a tool in statistics for assessing the accuracy 
of predictions. Values in a hypothesis class are compared against 
the values in true class to produce the rates of correct and wrong 
predictions.
False Negative Rate (Miss)
False Negative Rate =
True Negative Rate (Specificity)
True Negative Rate =
False Negative 
Total Positive
True Negative 
Total Negative
False Positive Rate (False Alarm)
False Positive Rate =
False Positive 
Total Negative
Precision
Accuracy
Precision = True Positive
True Positive +  False Positive
Accuracy — True Positive +  True Negative 
Total Positive +  Total Negative
F-measure
F-measure
(3.10)
(3 11)
(312)
(3T3)
(3.14)
(3.15)
1/precision +  1 /recall
Performance of classification accuracy (Eqn. 3.14) was used by Lyu and Farid 
in [82] to evaluate their proposed steganalysis methods. The same performance 
evaluation was used by Shi et al in [115]. In addition to classification accuracy, 
the performance was measured using true negative (Eqn. 3.11) and true positive
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(Eqn. 3.9) as presented by Shi et al in [113]. Besides classification accuracy, the 
detection results in [33] were evaluated using ’detection reliability’ p defined as /? =  
2A — 1, where A  is the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics(ROC) 
curve which will be discussed in the next section.
3.5.1 Receiver Operating Characteristics
An example of a ROC graph shown in Figure 3.9 can also be used to illustrate 
binary classifier performance. An ROC graph shows relative trade-off between 
true positives and false positives. Based on the discussion by Fawcett [30], the 
properties of ROC graph are as follow:
Liberal0.9
0.8
0.7
S. 0.6
I 0.5 a
I
Random G uess
0.3
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
False Positive Rate
Figure 3.9: Basic ROC graph of binary classification.
• Point (0,0) represents the point of never issuing a positive classification (false 
positive error or true positive),
• Point (1,1) corresponds to a classifier that predicts every case to be positive,
• Point (0,1) represents a perfect classification since it classifies all positive 
cases and negative cases correctly,
• Point (1,0) is the classifier with all incorrect classifications,
• Diagonal line (x = y), represents the strategy of random guessing, and
• Center of the diagonal line {x = 0.5,2/ =  0.5), represents the strategy of 
50-50 random guess.
3.5.2 Confidence Intervals
Most statisticians consider confidence interval estimation as the best method of 
presenting evidence obtained from a sample [1 2 ]. Confidence interval indicates
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the reliability of an estimation calculated from random samples of the population. 
Confidence interval provides a range of values that can include the relevant 
population parameters as shown in Figure 3.10.
Estimated value 
calculated from 
samples
True value in 
the population 
(unknown)
>- Confidence interval
Figure 3.10: Confidence interval gives an estimated range of values which is likely 
to include an unknown true value population parameter.
The confidence level is the probability value (1 — a), where a  is the significance 
level. Confidence level is normally associated with a confidence interval. 
Confidence level, which is expressed in percentage, shows how confident we 
are with the results to lie within the confidence interval. For example, say 
a  =  0.01 — 1%, then the confidence level is equal to (1-0.01) =  0.99 or a 99% 
confidence level. As shown in Figure 3.11, the higher the confidence level, the 
wider the confidence interval.
Estimated value 
calculated from 
sam ples
95% W 90%
Figure 3.11: Confidence level: probability getting a correct confidence interval.
In the area of steganalysis, confidence interval has not been used to support the 
final result of steganalysis. From the literature, some of the authors claimed to 
have a better performance just by comparing solely on the value of the estimated 
performance parameter. For example in [106], Quan et al simply compared their 
Cachin criterion [17] steganalysis method detection rates on F5, Outguess and
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JSteg to the results obtained in [33]. There is no statistical conclusion made to 
support their results. This situation has led to the idea of using confidence interval 
to support the final results of steganalysis in this thesis.
Let us take an example of confidence interval related to steganalysis. If we have 
a = 0.05 =  5%, then the confidence level equal to (1-0.05) =  0.95, or 95%. For 
example, if the classification accuracy was around 70%, with 95% confidence, the 
calculated probability of correct classification for the test images would be between 
6 6 % to 74% (70-4 and 70+4). By combining confidence level and confidence 
interval, we can say that we are 95% confident that the correct classification of 
image from the population would be between 6 6 % to 74%.
For large sample n, confidence interval for binomial operator [12] is given by
where p is an estimator of success, Za/2  is the z value from standard normal 
distribution and n is the number of samples.
Remarks 1. In classification, for n independent test images, p is the probability of success for 
a given classification performance parameter.
To apply the use of confidence interval in comparing the performance of 
steganalysis, comparison will be made to see whether the confidence interval 
between two or more approaches overlapped or not. According to Payton et al. 
[94], if two 95% confidence intervals do not overlapped, and the sample sizes are 
nearly equal, than the difference is statistically significant. Nevertheless, if the 
confidence intervals do not overlapped, then the comparison can be made based 
on the heuristic performance such as the classification accuracy. In other words, 
by comparing the confidence interval, it can provides a statistical significance to 
support the result in addition to the comparison of performance heuristic.
3.6 Summary
This chapter served as an introduction for machine learning based steganalysis 
implementation. Generally, the steganalysis phases commenced with the object 
selection task and ended with the evaluation of classifier performance. There were 
also instances involved in those phases such as the steganalysis features and the 
performance heuristic.
We then discussed the different experimental setups related to available image 
sources. The Ground Truth, B0W S2  and UCID image databases were discussed 
and different features such as Wavelets, DOT  and Markov were presented for the 
use as steganalysis features.
Two types of classification; binary and multi-class classification were discussed. 
We highlighted FLD, NN  and SVM  as examples of classifiers and compared 
different software packages of SVM, specifically, the Gist, SVMLight and LibSVM. 
Supporting the multi-class classification, LibSVM  was shown to be better as 
compared to Gist and SVMLight.
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We discussed some examples of performance heuristics used in classifier’s 
performance evaluation and also introduced confidence interval in providing 
statistical significant to support the predicted classifier’s performance.
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4 A ttack ing  JSteg  And F5
This chapter presents a detailed investigation and analysis of two steganalysis 
features; the D CT Features by Fridrich [33] and Markov Features by Shi et al 
[113].
In Section 4.1, we examine the impact of different image sources on the results of 
steganalysis. Particularly, D CT Features will be used in our steganalysis technique 
to attack JSteg. Furthermore, images captured by three different cameras in 
addition to a publicly available image dataset will be used for our investigation 
to determine whether there is any difference on steganalysis performances when 
cover images are taken from different sources.
In Section 4.2, we analyse and extend the 324 Markov Features employed in [113] 
to attack the F5 algorithm. We extend the Markov Features with the second-order 
Markov model for our experiment. In addition, we investigate the effect of doubly 
compressed images on steganalysis performance.
4.1 Steganalysing JSteg  With Different Image 
Sources
In Section 3.2, we discussed the different image databases used in steganalysis 
research. We highlighted how self-captured images together with images from 
different image databases were used in [97, 99, 83, 84, 115, 114] even though 
they were focusing on the same steganography methods such as F5 and Outguess. 
While the subsequent results were valid for that particular set of images, there 
is a question as to whether the results are still valid for real world steganalysis 
implementations where there exists a wide range of images with different properties 
and sources. By considering different devices to capture the images, it is expected 
that the performance of the steganalysis technique will be affected to a certain 
extent.
In this section, we discuss how the steganalysis techniques depend on the 
characteristics of training and test sets. One of the important characteristics 
in steganalysis is the statistics of the cover images. This is a problem for 
real-world implementations since the cover image source may not be available 
for comparison. With a wide range of image sources, training the classifier also 
becomes problematic. Even if all possible image sources have been included, the 
statistics of cover images will be likely to be very broad in their values and this 
makes steganalysis very challenging.
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4.1.1 Experimentation Setup Using DCT Features
Table 4.1 summarises the experimental setup for our investigation. To evaluate 
the performance of the steganalysis algorithm on JSteg, images captured using a 
Canon digital camera, Nokia mobile phone and Sony video camera are used. Even 
though the JSteg algorithm has been succeeded by other algorithms such as F5 
and Outguess, it is still one of the popular algorithms for steganalysis nowadays. 
For example, Kodovsky et al [70] carried out a quantitative steganalysis on JSteg. 
Their work strives to estimate the change rate defined as the relative number of 
embedding changes introduced by the steganography.
Table 4.1: The experimentation setup.
Task Description
Image Source Own captured and Philip Greenspun
Image Preparation Grayscale, cropped to the center of 640x480 pixels
Payload An image
Payload Size 128x128 pixels, 1 byte/pixel
Payload Embedding JSteg
Feature Extraction D CT Features
Classifier LibSVM
Performance Heuristic Classification accuracy
By using a digital camera, a mobile phone camera and a video camera we 
aim to represent a simulation of a small section of the vast variations in digital 
image acquisition. Furthermore, the individual properties within each camera 
pipeline (such as the camera resolution) given in Table 4.2 should yield perceptible 
variations between each image set. Samples of the images are presented in 
Figure 4.1. All images were decompressed, cropped about the centre to 640x480 
pixels, and then saved in JPEG format with QF=80.
Table 4.2: Device Specification.
Device Model Resolution Additional Info
Sony DCR-SR42 1 MP Digital video camera
Nokia N70 2MP Build in phone camera
Canon Powershot A550 7. IMP Canon Digital Camera
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Figure 4.1: Sample of our own captured images.
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It was stated by Bohme in [14] that the cropping technique helps to ensure that 
the image dimensions are uncorrelated with spatial characteristics, such as noise 
or local energy. However, by saving the cropped image in JPEG, a compression 
effect will be introduced to the resultant image. More discussions on how the 
compression can affect the steganalysis results are presented in Section 4.3.
Besides the three main sets of camera images (Canon, Nokia and Sony), a 
set of images from Philip Greenspun database [45] which consists of a balanced 
combination of indoor and outdoor images was also included. A total of 200 images 
were used from each image set.
After the cover image preparation process, each set of images went through the 
JSteg encoding process to produce stego image sets. The message embedded was 
an image with size of 128x128 pixels. W ith the cover and stego images available, 
a total of 23 D CT Features are then extracted from each image as previously 
discussed in Section 3.3.
The D C T Features were constructed by 23 functionals F  as given in Table 4.3. 
The functionals were applied to the examined image and its calibrated version 
J 2 . If F  is a scalar, the resultant features were actually the difference F ( J i ) —F ( J 2) 
while if F  is a vector or matrix, the features were the Li norm ||F (  Ji) — F ( J2 )|Ui- 
Li norm^ used for the purpose of dimensionality reduction.
Table 4.3: 23 functionals used to generate the DCT Features.
Functional/feature name Functional F
Global histogram H / \\H\\^^
Individual histograms for 5 
DCT modes
Dual histograms for 11 , ,^ 1  , j É ------- ^
DCT values (-5,...,5) «^ =11..
Variations V
Blockiness B i,B 2
Co-occurrence Noo,Noi,Nn  (features, not functionals)
Following the feature extraction process, the LibSVM  classifier was used to
perform binary classification. For SVM, the soft-margirF (C) and the kernel’s 
parameter gamma^ (7 ) were determined using parameter selection tool, ^grid.py^ 
that was available from the LibSVM  package. The classifier was first trained with 
150 pairs of randomly chosen images from each set and the remaining 50 pairs of 
images were then used for testing.
I^n [33], L i norm is defined for a vector or matrix as a sum of absolute values of all the vector 
or matrix elements.
Soft-margin controls the trade-off between the complexity of decision rules and frequency of 
error [25].
^7 parameter determines how the separating hyperplane is formed. Higher 7  values usually 
increase the number of support vectors.
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4.1.2 The Influential Factors On The Steganalysis 
Performance
Table 4.4 shows the classification accuracies related to four different image sets 
based on D CT Features in attacking JSteg. These results also show that the 
classification accuracy was seriously affected by the differences in the training sets 
used to train the classifier.
Table 4.4: The Detection Accuracy of Steganalysis using D C T Features on JSteg.
Test Set Training Set
G N S G C+N G+N+S C +N +S+G
Canon 1 0 0 % 95.0% 99.0% 83.0% 1 0 0 % 98.0% 99%
Nokia 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 97.0% 97.0% 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 %
Sony 95.0% 93.0% 99.0% 91.0% 95.0% 99.0% 98.0%
Greenspun 80.0% 84.0% 8 8 .0 % 96.0% 82.0% 92.0% 94.0%
C +  N 1 0 0 % 97.5% 98.0% 90.0% 1 0 0 % 99.0% 99.5%
C +  N +  S 98.3% 96.0% 98.3% 90.3% 98.3% 99.0% 99.0%
C + N + S + G 93.8% 93.0% 95.8% 91.8% 94.3% 97.3% 98.3%
C : Canon
N : Nokia
S : Sony
G : Greenspun
C+N : Canon and Nokia
C +N +S : Canon, Nokia and Sony
C+N+S+G : Canon, Nokia, Sony and Greenspun
The Preceding Information Factor
The accuracies along the diagonal direction in Table 4.4 have demonstrated tha t 
the classifier gives the best performance when trained and tested using the same 
image set. However, the performance decreases when the test set is not previously 
included in the classifier training process. An example is when the classifier is 
trained with C+N  images, and then tested with C+N+S  and C+N+S+G  image 
sets. The Sony and Greenspun are new sets of images which are unknown to the 
classifier. W ith an accuracy of 100% for the C+N  test images, the accuracy is 
lower for C+N+S and C+N+S+G  image sets, with rates of 98.3% and 94.3%, 
respectively.
This situation can be linked to what was observed by Kharrazi et al. [64] 
when Fusion techniques were used to improve image steganalysis performance. 
The only difference between our findings and the observation in [64] was the 
type of information that was not used during the steganalyser training process. 
In our work, the absent information are the features of the cover images from 
specific image set (Sony and Greenspun), while in [64] it was the features of 
the steganographic algorithms. Kharrazi et al. employed a trained steganalyser 
using a specific embedding technique, that performed well when tested on stego
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images from that particular embedding technique. However, the classifier did not 
perform well in detecting stego images from embedding techniques which were not 
in the training set. This was also mentioned by Bar ni et a l in [7], when the 
performance of a steganalyser was found to be dependant on the knowledge that 
the steganalyser has on the steganographic algorithm.
Under-fitting and Over-fitting
In our steganalysis experiment, we also observed examples of under-fitting and 
over-fitting problems. Under-fitting happens when the classifier is trained on 
insufficient and complex training features. The classification model then fails to 
accurately detect complicated features in the test set. This situation can be seen 
in Figure 4.2.
Training Testing
Figure 4.2: Under-fitting problem, features which are clearly separated in training 
set but hardly separated in the testing set.
From our experiment, under-fitting happened when the classifier was tested with 
the hardest detectable Greenspun’s image set. It can be seen tha t the classifier’s 
performance was at its lowest rate for all the image sets in this case.
Over-fitting on the other hand happens when the classifier is trained with 
complicated features. Figure 4.3 illustrates that the features may overlapped 
between the different classes. The resultant classification model may become 
extremely complex and this can cause a poor performance even with the 
non-complex features in test set.
From Table 4.4, an over-fitting example is derived when the classifier is trained 
with images from the hardest detectable Greenspun’s image set. The detection 
accuracy for all other image sets decreases when tested with the classifier. The 
worst case can be seen for the Canon image set where the rate decrease from 
100% to 83%. Therefore, these under-fitting and over-fitting examples provide a 
justification of how important it is for us to have a correct set of training images 
especially when blind steganalysis is under consideration.
Moreover, the problem with the above situations is the practicality for real-world 
implementation of the technique. In [64], it has been demonstrated how the 
computational time increases as the training set size is enlarged. In their
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Training Testing
Figure 4.3: Over-fitting problem, features which are hardly separated in training 
set but clearly separated in testing set.
experiment, a training set consisting of 1 1 0 ,0 0 0  images took more than 1 1  hours 
to train the classifier. In our case, if there is a new source of image found, then 
the classifier has to be re-trained. If we try to cover all possible image sources, 
then it would take a significant amount of time to retrain the classifier.
4.2 Extension Of Markov Features In Attacking 
F5
The previous section has demonstrated how different image sets have contributed 
to different results when attacking JSteg with DCT Features. In this section, we 
continue our review on steganalysing tasks by utilizing the Markov Features to 
defeat F5 which was briefly discussed in Section 3.3.
F5 was introduced by Westfeld [130], in association with an accompanying 
Java-based application we referred as FSSoftware^ in this thesis. Soon after being 
introduced to the steganography community, F5 has become a popular target 
for steganalysis. This is due to its capability to withstand visual and statistical 
attacks while providing a large steganographic capacity. Examples of steganalyser 
research on F5 includes the D CT Features by Fridrich et al. [36, 33], indices o f 
the quantised D CT coefficients features by Harmsen et al. [50], Wavelet Features 
by Lyu & Farid [84], Markov Features by Shi et al. [113], Bhattacharyya Distance 
feature by Wang et al. [126] and Joint Transform Features by Khan & Mansoor 
[62]. Among them, [62, 113, 84, 126] implemented FSSoftware to generate their 
F5 stego images.
In this section, the Markov Features are used to steganalyse F5 which was 
implemented using FBSoftware. In addition, we extend the Markov Features 
to include the statistics from the second-order transition probability matrix. 
Furthermore, an isolated F5 embedding algorithm; F5Py [15], which excludes 
the decompression and re-compression processing was used as an option, in order 
to avoid the double-compression problem.
^Available at; h ttp ://w w w .in f.tu -d r e sd e n .d e /~ w e stfe ld /f5
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4.2.1 Markov Features and F5
Steganalysis using Markov Features [113] utilises a first-order Markov model to 
generate second order statistics from the JPEG coefficient arrays. The extracted 
324 Markov Features have been shown to be effective in defeating F5. By using 
different message sizes, the highest accuracy of 96.8% was achieved for a message 
size of 0.4 bits per nonzero DCT coefficient. They suggested that a second-order 
Markov model should improve the performance, but did not proceed with the 
implementation due to its computational complexity. In this section, we conduct 
a set of experiments to verify their suggestion.
In Markov Features based steganalysis, it is expected tha t the disturbance 
caused by the steganographic methods in JPEG images can be enlarged by 
observing the absolute difference between an element and one of its neighbours in 
the JPEG coefficient array.
By referring to Figure 4.4 and denoting the JPEG coefficient array as 
F (u ,v)(u  e  [0, (Su — l],u  e  [0,Sv — 1]), where Su and Sy are the size of JPEG 
two dimensional array in horizontal and vertical directions, the difference between 
the arrays are generated by :
Fh{u, v) = F{u, v) -  F{u  +  1, u),
Fy{u, v) = F{u, v) -  F{u, u +  1),
Fd{u, v) = F{u, v) -  F{u  4-1, u -k 1),
Fm{u, v) = F{u 4 -1, u) -  F(u, V 4-1),
where u e  [0,5'^  ^ -  2],u G [ 0 , -  2] and Fh{u,v),Fy{u,v),Fd{u,v) and Fm{u,v) 
denote the difference between the arrays in horizontal, vertical, main diagonal and 
minor diagonal directions, respectively.
The generated difference between absolute values of the JPEG coefficient arrays 
are then modeled as a Markov random process^ and characterized by the first-order 
transition probability matrix as shown in Table 4.5. It refers to the transition
probabilities between two immediately neighbouring elements in the difference
coefficient array, as shown in Figure 4.5. Four transition probability matrices Mh, 
My, Md and are constructed as
M  a  i)  — ^ ^ = 1  v)  — 2 , Fh{u -k 1, ^) — j )
S{Fy{u, v) =  i, Fy(u, V +  1) =  j )
' T , (4.2)
m m  i) =  Z ! : ; ' V) =  i ,F,{u +  l , v  +  l ) =  j )
Af (-■ ,■) E u = l^E ^l^^(J^m (u  + l , v ) = i , F , n ( u , V + l ) = j )
® A random process whose future probabilities are determined by its immediate preceding value
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JPEG 2-D Array
(a) Horizontal
(b) Vertical
L1/r
4
-
"T-
JPEG Z-D Am y
(c) Main Diagonal
'
X
JPEG Z-D Am y
(d) Minor Diagonal
Figure 4.4: Generation of four difference JPEG coefficient arrays by [113].
wfiere Su and Sy denote tfie dimensions of tfie image and <^=1 if and only if its 
argument (s) are satisfied.
A thresholding technique is applied to further reduce the computational 
complexity. By selecting a threshold value T, only values that fall into 
—T,..,-1 ,0 ,1 ,. . . ,r  from the absolute values of the JPEG coefficient arrays are 
considered. Values larger than T  were set to T  and values smaller than - T  were 
set to -T. The result will be a transition probability matrix with a dimensionality 
of (2 T + l)  X  (2 T + l).
In summary, (2T’+ l)x (2 T ’+ l)  elements for each of the four transition 
probability matrices contribute to (2T + l)x (2 T + l)x 4  dimensional features for 
steganalysis. By setting the threshold value to 4, the resultant transition 
probability matrix is 9x9 for each of the differences in four directions of the 
coefficient arrays. In total, 324 feature elements were constructed ((9x9) x 4). 
The procedure is summarised in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.5: First-order transition probability.
Feature Vector /
Horizontal 
[Mfference Array
MnorDit^onal 
Difference Array
Main Diagonal 
Difference Array
Transition 
R-obability Matrix
Transition 
Pt-obability Matrix
(2T+1)<2T+1)
Feature Components
{2T+1H2T+I) 
Feature Components
(2T+1K2T+1) 
Feature Components
(2T+1X2T+1)
Feature Components
Figure 4.6: Generation of four difference JPEG coefficient arrays by [113].
Extending Markov Features with Second-Order Transition Probability 
Matrix
As an extension to the original Markov Features, we examined the disturbance 
caused by the steganographic methods in JPEG images by observing the difference 
between an element and two of its neighbours in the JPEG coefficient array, 
as shown in Figure 4.7. Therefore, we consider the use of a second-order 
transition probability matrix (as shown in Table 4.6) which refers to the transition 
probabilities between three consecutive elements.
- t* >P
Figure 4.7: Second-order transition probability.
In our work, by setting the threshold value to 4, the resultant transition 
probability matrix is 9x9x9  for each of the differences in four directions of the 
coefficient arrays. In total, (9x9x9)x4  =  2916 feature elements were constructed.
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4.3 The Double Compression Issue
Westfeld’s F5 implementation {FSSoftware), is not able to work directly on JPEG 
input files. An input file in JPEG format would need to be decompressed (using a 
standard Application Programming Interface (API) function to load the image), 
and represented internally in the spatial domain. The image is then re-compressed, 
and the F5 embedding is performed during the compression phase.
According to Pevny and Fridrich [38], double compression occurs when a 
JPEG image, originally compressed with a primary quantisation matrix, is 
decompressed and compressed again with different secondary quantisation matrix. 
In steganalysis, by using a cover image in JPEG format, it means that the image 
used has been compressed at least once. The F5Software then decompresses and 
re-compresses the images with a QF=80, before performing the embedding process. 
If the cover image was previously compressed with QF other that QF=80, then 
the resulting output of this process is a double compressed stego image.
From the literature, we have isolated three main methods on how to handle 
double compressed images. The first approach presented by Lyu h  Farid in [83], 
described the idea of using the same QF to eliminate the double compression. In 
their approach, they set the same QF for image preparation and stego image 
generation. A similar approach was used by Fridrich et al. [38] but not by 
specifically setting the same QF for both cover preparation and embedding process. 
To resolve the double compression issue, they estimated the quantisation matrix 
used for the compression of the cover image, and then used this matrix for the 
re-compression and embedding process.
A third approach to deal with double compression has been proposed by Chen et 
al. [2 1 ]. Firstly, they set the same QF=80 for both image preparation and the F5 
embedding processes. Following that, all the cover images also went through the 
F5 embedding process but without any message embedded as shown in Figure 4.8. 
By doing that, both the cover and stego images are assumed to have the same 
compression effects and if there are differences between them, then it should have 
been contributed only by the embedding process. Briffa et al. [15] stated tha t 
F5 with no message did actually contains 32 bits embedded, namely the status 
block saying that there is a message of length 0. This embedded information may 
produce the same artifacts as with the normal embedded message. This might 
therefore contribute more false positives in the steganalysis result.
The three approaches discussed assume that double compression is an inherent 
part of F5. W hat can be seen is that the compression process still occurs, and the 
risk of its effect is still present. The best solution probably would be to implement 
F5 directly on an image without any process of decompression and re-compression. 
This applies not only for F5 but also other JPEG based steganography such as 
Outguess [103], where decompression and re-compression is fundamental in their 
implementation.
For the above reason. Briffa et al. [15] in their Python implementation of F5 
(F5Py) avoided this extra compression by working directly on the JPEG input file. 
F5Py read JPEG files and performed the Huffmann decoding to obtain the JPEG 
coefficient matrix. The F5 embedding then operated on this JPEG coefficient 
matrix. Moreover, it never reversed the lossy compression steps.
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Stego  image
Cover Image
Cover Image
Com pressed  
cover image
Steganography with 
m essage  em bedded  
(decompression and 
com pression involved)
Steganography without 
m essage  em bedded  
(decom pression and 
com pression involved)
Figure 4.8: Steganalysis approach to deal with double compression as what has 
been proposed by Chen et al. [2 1 ]. Besides the stego images, the 
cover images also went through the embedding process but without 
any message embedded.
In the following section we will discuss the implementation of these different 
approaches in dealing with double compression while attacking F5.
4.3.1 Experimentation Setup
To evaluate the performance of the first-order and second-order Markov Features, a 
total of 1000 images from UCID image database were used. This image database is 
chosen because it provides images that are free from any compression. All images 
were cropped about the centre to create images with a resolution of 640 x 480 
pixels, and then saved in JPEG format with QF=70 and QF=80. These different 
quality factors were used for the purpose of investigating the double compression 
problem which we discussed in the previous section. Table 4.7 summarises the 
experimental setup for this work.
Table 4.7: The experimentation setup.
Task Description
Image Source UCID database’s images
Object Preparation Cropped about the center of 640x480 pixels
Payload Random generated bits
Payload Size 250 bytes and 500 bytes
Payload Embedding F5Software and F5Py
Feature Extraction First-order Markov Features and
Second-order Markov Features
Classifier LibSVM
Performance Heuristic Classification accuracy
After the image preparation process, all the images went through FSSoftware
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and F5Py to produce sets of stego images with message size of 250 bytes 
and 500 bytes embedded. Following that, both the first-order Markov 
Features and second-order Markov Features were extracted for the subsequent 
binary-classification process using LibSVM. Training images were based on a 
random selection of 90% of the cover and stego image pairs. The remaining 10% 
of the image pairs were used for classifier testing.
Generally, four different approaches can be seen as follows:
• QF70 - FôSoftware : Cover image saved in JPEG format with QF of 70 and 
went through the FôSoftware with different payload sizes to produce sets of 
stego images.
• QF80 - FôSoftware : Cover image saved in JPEG format with QF of 80 and 
went through the FôSoftware with different payload sizes to produce sets of 
stego images.
• QF70 - F5Py : Cover image saved in JPEG format with QF of 70 and 
went through the FôPy with different payload sizes to produce sets of stego 
images.
• QF80 - F5Py : Cover image saved in JPEG format with QF of 80 and 
went through the FôPy with different payload sizes to produce sets of stego 
images.
4.3.2 The Outcome
The results presented in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show the classification accuracy 
for both first-order and second-order Markov Features. The findings showed 
the possibility of the expected double compression problem. Particularly, the 
classification accuracy was affected when double compressed cover images were 
considered for both the first-order Markov Features and second-order Markov 
Features. The results in QF=70 -FôSoftware approach show that Markov Features 
are detecting the double compression rather than the embedding effects.
Second-order Markov Features Performance
From the results in Figure 4.10, we can see that the classification accuracies 
for second-order Markov Features are lower as compared to first-order Markov 
Features. Furthermore, we can compare the value of C and 7  parameters for 
both versions of Markov Features in the SVM training process. C determines the 
margin on the decision boundary as shown in Figure 4.11 while 7  determines the 
fiexibility of the decision boundary as shown in Figure 4.12.
A smaller value of C will ignore support vectors close to the boundary and 
increases the margin. A smaller value of 7  makes the decision boundary more 
linear, and increasing its value will increase the flexibility of the decision boundary. 
Furthermore, according to Han et al. [48], a large value of 7  will consider all the 
support vectors, while a smaller value of 7  would ignore most of the support 
vectors that contribute to the different fiexibility of the decision boundary.
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Figure 4.9: Classification accuracy and confidence interval for first-order Markov 
Features.
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c=ioo c=io
0  - 0 .5  0 . 0  0 . 5  1 .0  - 1 . 0  - 0 . 5  0 .0  0 . 5  1 . 0
Figure 4.11: The effect of the (7, on the decision boundary. A smaller value of C 
allows to ignore support vector close to the boundary, and increases 
the margin [1 1 ].
For example, let us consider the QF=80-F5Software approach with 250 bytes 
embedded message. Since we are using the ‘easy.py’ tools in LibSVM, it 
determines the C and 7  parameters automatically for the best performance during 
the training process. For first-order Markov Features, optimum performance is 
achieved using C = 8192 and 7  =  0.0019. In contrast, for the second-order 
Markov Features, (7 =  2 and 7  =  8 , We can see how the first-order Markov 
Features creates a smaller margin with a near linear decision boundary while the 
second-order Markov Features creates a larger margin with non-linear decision 
boundary. This may provide a reason on why the classification accuracy rates 
are lower for second-order Markov Features as compared to first-order Markov 
Features.
We further explore this situation by performing the feature selection process 
based on Fisher score (F-Score) for each features in second-order Markov Features. 
F-score is a simple and effective criterion to measure the discrimination between 
a feature and the class label. A larger F-score indicates that the feature is more 
discriminative. From Chang et al. [19], given training instances Xi,i = 1 ,...,/, the 
F-score of the j th  feature is defined as:
F(J) = (4.5)
n +
where
• and n_ are the number of positive (stego) and negative (cover) instances, 
respectively.
• Xj, Xj^^ and x^~  ^ are the average of the j th  feature of the whole, positive 
labeled and negative labeled data sets.
•  ® . - 7  /  ® 1 7
is the j th  feature of the zth positive/negative instance.
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g a u s s i a n ,  g a m m a = 0 . 1 g a u s s i a n ,  g a m m a = l
g a u s s i a n ,  g a m m a = 1 0 g a u s s i a n ,  g a m m a = 1 0 0
- 0 . 5  0 , 0  0 . 5  1 . 0 - 1 . 0  - 0 . 5  0.0 0 . 5  1 . 0
Figure 4.12: The effect of the 7  parameter of the Gaussian kernel for a fixed value 
of C. For small values of 7 , the decision boundary is nearly linear. As 
increases the flexibility of the decision boundary increases [1 1 ].
We run the F-score based feature selection process using select.py' module 
in LihSVM  on one of the training sets for second-order Markov features. We 
found that the best classification accuracy on training set was achieved when 
the total features is 22 as shown in Figure 4.13. From this result, we can see 
that the second-order Markov Features performance possibly can be improved by 
additional process such as the features selection process. These findings provide 
a better evaluation on the effectiveness of current steganalysis techniques, and 
helps pave the way for improved design and implementations of future steganalysis 
techniques.
t r y  f e a t u r e  s i z e s :  [2916,  1458,  729 ,1364 ,  182, 91, 45,  22]
%ifFeat 
2916: 
14 58: 
729: 
364: 
182 :  
91:
45 :
2 2 :
e s t .  acc .
47 .7 8 9 5 0  
48 .7 3 6 8 0
49 .7 8 9 5 0  
50 .10530
51 .26320
51 .26320 
50 .31580 
52 .52630
max v a l i d a t i o n  a c c u a r c y :  52 .526300
s e l e c t  f e a t u r e s :  [2199,  2280,  2361, 2442,  2523, 2604,  2685,  2766, 2847,  741,  822, 903, 984,  
1065,  1146,  1227,  1308,  1389,  60, 141,  222,  303]
22 f e a t u r e s
Figure 4.13: The features selection output using fselect.py’ module in LihSVM.
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F5Py Advantages
F5Py provides a new approach on how to deal with the double compression issue. 
From Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10, F5Py is shown to provide reliable results in both 
cases of QF=70 and QF=80. Comparing this new implementation with previous 
approaches, it can be seen that:
• Using stego image with zero message [21] resolved the problem with different 
quality factor in preparation and embedding process. One disadvantage is 
that there will be more time needed in order to prepare the F5 with no 
message set.
• Using F5Py resolved the above problem. W ith an advantage, of time-saving 
by excluding an additional image preparation process such a the process to 
estimate the primary quantisation matrix in [38].
• Using F5Py resolved the issue of the unknown additional JPEG compression 
with cover image.
4.4 Summary
This chapter has shown that steganalysis performance is affected by the source of 
the cover image. With an expectation that the different image source will create an 
image with different properties, it is also expected that steganalysis performance 
will be affected by those differences. In our experiments, four different image 
sources were considered. By using D CT Features on JSteg steganography, it can 
be seen that the steganalysis performance is significantly less effective for cover 
images from certain sources.
We conclude that it is quite difficult to make the steganalysis algorithms 
reliable for real-world applications where the image source cannot necessarily 
be determined. This is due to the fact that the steganalysis algorithm requires 
detailed information about the cover source. Our experiments have shown that 
performance claims previously made have to assume knowledge about the cover 
source. If the steganalyst is not able to train the steganalyser using cover images 
from a very similar source, significant error rates can be expected.
Furthermore, in this chapter, the performance of steganalysis techniques on 
F5 using Markov Features proposed in [113] and its extended version has been 
analysed. Westfeld’s F5Software implementation is known to have one serious 
flaw, where the image is decompressed and re-compressed before embedding. Using 
F5Software purely for steganalysis is clearly unreliable due to the inherent double 
compression issue. This situation suggests the reasons why the double compression 
issue cannot be ignored in steganalysis work. As an alternative way of dealing with 
the double compression issue, the use of F5Py has been proposed.
Moreover, this chapter has shown how the large number of features does not 
necessarily guarantee a better performance on steganalysis results. In fact, the 
most important factor is how effective the features are for recognising small 
differences, or drawing fine distinctions between the cover and stego images.
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The following chapter will look at the performance of our proposed conditional 
probability features undertaking the steganalysis of F5py.
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Steganalysis Features
In this chapter, we propose new steganalysis features based on the conditional 
probability statistics known as conditional probability features (CP Features). 
The CP Features will be discussed in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, the CP 
Features, will be used in steganalysing the F5 implemented with F5Py as 
discussed in Section 4.3. We also compare the performance of the proposed 
CP Features to D CT Features and Markov Features in terms of classification 
accuracy and confidence interval. The results will be presented in Section 5.3. 
This section will also discuss improvements to the CP Features performance by 
using two calibration approaches; the difference of features set from the original 
and calibrated images [100], and the Cartesian product of both feature sets [69]. 
Moreover, we discuss the combination of CP Features with D C T Features in 
Section 5.3.3.
5.1 The Proposed CP Features
We start the discussion with the introduction to conditional probability. Prom 
Bhattacharyya et al. [1 2 ], the revised probability of B  when it is known that A 
has occurred is called the conditional probability of B  given A and is defined by 
the equation:
n B \ A )  = W  (5.1)
Figure 5.1 illustrates P{A) ,P{B)  and P{AB)  using a Venn diagram. Based 
on the concept of conditional probability, the CP Features are collected from the 
absolute values of a JPEG DCT coefficient array (Definition 1 , pg. 32) as shows 
in Figure 5.2. For each location, p, q and r  will traverse throughout the DCT 
coefficient array. We derive the CP Features from DCT coefficient arrays since 
in steganalysis of JPEG images, the features extracted directly from embedding 
domain shown to achieve the best performance as what discussed in [100]. The 
examples include D CT Features and Markov Features which are extracted directly 
from the DCT coefficients of the examined image.
The locations of p, q and r are selected with the intention to focus only on the 
quarter of the 8 x 8  block (upper right part) of the DCT coefficient array with the 
DC coefficient value excluded. This is due to the properties of DCT coefficient 
array, where most of the values in the lower left part of the 8 x 8  block of the 
DCT coefficient are usually zeros as shown in Figure 5.3. This condition makes 
it possible that the statistics calculated by using those values with our proposed 
approach will not provide a significant impact. However, from our experiments
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P(AB) P(B)P(A)
Figure 5.1: Venn diagram illustrates P{A),P{B) ,  and P{AB).
Figure 5.2: The location of p, q and r  in generating the CP Features.
we found that these zeros actually have a strong influence in our proposed CP 
Features. We will discuss this zeros effect further in Section 5.3.
Comparing our CP Features with the Markov process based approach by Shi 
et al. [113], the Markov Features are collected by comparing all the values in 
the resultant horizontal, vertical, diagonal and minor diagonal directions of DCT 
coefficient array differences as discussed in Section 4.2.1. In contrast, our proposed 
approach is simpler as the statistics are collected directly from the absolute values 
(Ia;I) of the DCT coefficient array.
For our implementation, three preconditions or event A were considered
A i ' . r  <q,  
A 2 : r > q ,  
As ' . r  = q. (5 .2)
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Figure 5.3: The DCT coefficients.
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Next, three probabilities or event B  were considered
B i : p < q ,
^ 2  : P  >  g,
B 3 i p  = q. (5.3)
Rather than working on 8 x 8  block, let us take a smaller 4x4 block of the DCT 
coefficients. This is to ensure that each value except for the DC coefficient and 
the first element of each 4x4 block, are taken into account while generating CP 
Features. Given an array of 4x4 block M  of the DCT coefficients, for 8  different 
locations of p, q and r, eight feature sets are constructed as follows:
fii =  P { M { u P l , v )  
P{M{u  +  l , u )  
P{M{u  +  l ,v)  
P{M{u-\- l ,v)  
P{M{u  +  l , u )  
P{M{u +  1,1;) 
P ( M ( w  +  l , i ; )  
P{M{u  + 1 , 1 ; )  
P ( M ( i i  + 1 , 1 ; )
<  M{u  +  2,v)
< M{u  +  2,v)
< M{u  +  2 , 1;)
>  M{u +  2,1;)
>  M{u  +  2, v)
> M{u  +  2 , 1;) 
= M(i/ +  2 , 1;) 
=  M{u  +  2 , 1;) 
= M(u + 2 , i;)|
\{M{u +  3 , 1;) 
| ( M ( i t +  3 , 1;) 
\{M{u +  3 , v) 
| ( M ( u +  3 , 1;) 
\{M{u +  3 , 1;) 
| ( M ( i i  +  3 , 1;) 
\{M{u +  3 , 1;) 
\{M{u +  3,1)) 
{M{u +  3 , 1;)
< M(u +  2 , 1;]
> M(ii +  2 , 1)] 
=  M(w + 2 , 1)]
< M{u + 2,v]
> M{u +  2 , 1;] 
=  M ( u  +  2 , 1;)
< M{u +  2, v)
> M{u +  2 , 1;] 
= M(w +  2 , 1;) (5 .4 )
fl2 =  P ( M ( u , i ;  +  1 
P ( M ( i / , i ;  +  1 
P{M{u,v  + 1  
P{M{u,v  4- 1  
P{M{u,v  + 1  
P{M{u,v +  1 
P{M{u,v + 1  
P ( M ( u , i )  + 1  
P ( M ( i i , i )  + 1 )
< M{u w +  2) ( M ( i i D T  3 < M{u i; +  2 ) ) ,
< M{u i; +  2) {M{u D +  3 > M{u, i; +  2 ) ) ,
< M{u, % +  2) ( M ( u , 1; +  3 = M{u, i; +  2 ) ) ,
> M{u, r  +  2) ( M ( i i , 1; +  3 < M{u, ^ +  2 ) ) ,
> M{u, % +  2) ( M ( i i , 1; +  3 > M{u, i; +  2 ) ) ,
> M{u, v  +  2) (M ( iz , = M{u, ^ +  2 ) ) ,
= M{u, % +  2) ( M ( i i , 1; +  3 < M{u, i; +  2 ) ) ,
= M{u, i; +  2) (M (w , v-\-S > M{u, i; +  2 ) ) ,
) = M(u, v +  2 ) | ( M ( w , d +  3) = M{u, i; +  2 ) ) . (5 .6 )
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fis =  P (M (u+  l,i; +  1 
P{M{u  + 1 , 1  +  1 
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  +  ] 
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  +  ] 
P (M (i + 1 , 1  + 1 
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  +  1 
P{M{u  + 1 , 1  +  1 
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  +  1 
P{M{u  + 1, 1  +  1
< M{u + 2 , 1  +  2
< M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
< M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
> M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
> M (i +  2 , i  +  2 )
> M (i + 2,1 +  2) 
=  M ( i  + 2, 1  +  2 
= M (i + 2,1 +  2)
li +  3 ,1  +  3) 
( M ( u  +  3 ,1  +  3) 
( i  +  3 ,1  +  3) 
(A f  ( i  +  3 ,1  +  3) 
( M ( i  +  3 , 1  +  3) 
{M{u +  3 ,1  +  3) 
li +  3 ,1  +  3) 
(A4 ( i  +  3 ,1  +  3)
— A4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2)1 (A4 ( i  +  3 , 1  +  3)
<  A 4(u  +  2 , 1  +  2 ) )
>  A 4(u  +  2 , 1  +  2 ))  
=  A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2 ))
<  A 4 (u  +  2 , 1  +  2 ))
>  A 4 (u  +  2 , i  +  2 ))  
=  A 4 ( i  + 2 , 1  +  2 ))
>  A 4(u  + 2 , 1  +  2 ))
<  A 4 ( i  +  2 , i  +  2 ) )  
=  A 4 (u  +  2 , 1  +  2 ) ) . (5 .8 )
fl4 =  P ( A 4 ( i  +  l , i )  
P{M{u  +  l , i )  
P{M{u  +  l , i )  
P{M{u  +  l , i )  
P{M{u  +  l , i )  
P{M{u  +  l , i )  
P{M{u  +  1, i )  
P{M{u  +  1, i )  
P{M{u  +  l , i )
<  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( i , i  +  1)  <  A 4 (u  +  1 , 1  +  1
<  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( i , i  +  1)  >  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  ]
<  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( i , i  +  1)  =  A 4 (u  +  1 , 1  +  1
>  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( u , i  +  1)  <  A 4(u  +  1 , 1  +  1
>  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( i , i  +  1)  >  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  1
>  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( u , i  +  1)  =  A 4 (u  +  1 , 1  +  ] 
=  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( i , i  +  1) <  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  1 
=  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( u , i  +  1)  >  A 4( i  +  1 , 1  +  1 
=  A 4(u  +  1 , 1  +  l ) | ( A 4 ( u ,  1  +  1) =  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  1 (5 .1 0 )
fis =  P ( A 4 ( i  +  2 , i )  
P ( A 4 ( i  +  2, i )  
P ( A 4 ( i  +  2 , i )  
P{M{u  +  2 , i )  
P{M{u  +  2, i )  
P{M{u  +  2 , i )  
P{M{u  +  2 , i )  
P{M{u  +  2 , i )  
P{M{u  +  2 , i )
<  A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2)
<  A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2)
<  A4(w +  2 , i  +  2)
>  A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2)
>  A 4(u  +  2 , 1  +  2)
>  A 4 ( i  +  2 , i  +  2 
=  A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2) 
=  A4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2)
( A 4 ( i , i  +  2) <  A4 
| ( A 4 ( u , i  +  2) >  A4 
| ( A 4 ( i , i  +  2) =  A4 
| (A 4 (u ,  1  +  2) <  A4 
| ( A 4 ( i , i  +  2) >  A4 
u, 1  +  2) =  A4 
| ( A 4 ( i , i  +  2) <  A4 
| ( A 4 ( i , i  +  2) >  A4
=  A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  2) I (A 4( i ,  1  +  2) =  A4(
1  +  2 , 1  +  2 )) 
1  +  2 , 1  +  2 )) 
1  +  2 , 1  +  2)) 
1  +  2 , 1  +  2)) 
1  +  2 , 1  +  2 )) 
( i  +  2,1 +  2)) 
( i  +  2,1 +  2)) 
( i  +  2,1 +  2)) 
1  +  2 , 1  +  2)). (5 .1 2 )
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fis = P (M (i +  2 ,i) 
P{M{u + 2 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  + 2 , 1 ) 
P (M (i +  2 ,i) 
P{M{u  + 2 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  +  2 , 1 ) 
P (M (i +  2, v) 
P(M(u  + 2 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  + 2 , 1 )
<  M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
<  M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
< M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
> M (i +  2 ,i  + 2)
>  M{u +  2 , 1  +  2)
>  M{u +  2 , 1  +  2) 
=  M (i + 2, 1  +  2) 
=  M(u +  2, 1  +  2)
|(M (i,i  +  2) 
|(M (i,i  +  2) 
|(M (u,i +  2) 
|(M (i,i  +  2) 
|(M (i,i  +  2) 
|(M (i,i  +  2) 
|(M (i,i  +  2) 
l ( M ( i , i  +  2)
=  M{u  + 2,1 + 2 )|(M (i,i +  2)
< M ( 1  +  2,1  +  2)),
> M(u + 2,1 + 2)) 
=  M (i +  2, 1  +  2))
< M (i +  2 ,i  +  2))
> M (i +  2 ,i  +  2)) 
=  M  ( 1  +  2,1  +  2))
< M (i +  2 ,i  +  2))
> M(u +  2 ,i +  2)) 
=  M{u +  2,1 + 2)). (5.14)
fis = P (M (i + 3,1 ) 
P{M{u  + 3 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  + 3,1 ) 
P{M{u  + 3 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  + 3 , 1 ) 
P (M (i + 3 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  + 3 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  +  3 , 1 ) 
P{M{u  + 3 , 1 )
<[ M ( 1  +  3 , 1  +  3)
<  M ( 1  +  3 , 1  +  3)
<  M ( 1  +  3 , 1  +  3)
>  M ( 1  +  3 , 1  +  3)
>  M ( 1  +  3 , 1  +  3)
>  M{u +  3 ,1  +  3) 
=  M ( i  +  3 , 1  +  3) 
=  M ( i  +  3 ,1  +  3) 
= M{u +  3 ,1  +  3)1
\{M{u 1  +  3) <  M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
\{M{u 1  +  3) > M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
| ( M ( i , 1  +  3) = M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
l ( M ( i , 1  +  3) < M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
| ( M ( i , 1  +  3) > M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
| ( M ( i , 1  +  3) = M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
l(M (?/, 1  +  3) < M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
l ( M ( i , 1  +  3) > M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) ,
(M(%/, 1  +  3) = M 1  +  3 , 1  +  3 ) ) . (5.16)
fi7 = P (M (i +  1 ,1  
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  
P{M{u  +  1 , 1  
P{M{u  + 1 , 1  
P (M (i+  1 ,1  
P{M{u  + 1 , 1 )
< M (i +  2,1 +  1)1 (M (i + 3,1 +  2
<  M{u +  2,1 +  1
< M (i +  2,1 + 1
>  M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  1
> M (i +  2,1 + ]
>  M{u +  2,1 +  1 
=  A 4 (i +  2 ,1  +  1 
=  M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  1
M{u  + 3,1 + 2 
u + 3, 1  +  2 
M(u + 3,1 +  2 
li +  3, 1  +  2 
M (i +  3,1 +  2 
M (i +  3,1 +  2 
M(u +  3,1 +  2
= M (i +  2 ,i  +  l) |(M (i +  3,1 +  2)
<  M{u  +  2 , 1  +  1
>  M ( i  +  2 ,1  +  1 
=  M(u +  2,1 +  1
<  M ( i t  +  2 , 1  +  1
>  M ( u  +  2 , 1  +  1 
) =  M{u +  2,1 + 1 
) < M (i +  2, 1  +  1 
) >  M ( i t  +  2 , 1  +  1)
=  M ( i  +  2 , i  +  l ) ) .  (5 .18 )
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/Z8 =  F(M
P{M
P{M
P{M
P{M
P{M
P{M
P{M
P{M
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
1,1 +  1 
( i , i  +1)
< M (i +
<  M ( i  +
< M (i +
> M (i +
>  M ( i  +
> M (i +  
=  M ( i  +  
=  M (i  +
1,1 +  2) 
1,1 +  2) 
1,1 +  2) 
1,1 + 2) 
1,1 +  2) 
1,1 +  2) 
1,1; 4-2) 
1,1 +  2)
| ( M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3  
| ( M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3 
| ( M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3 
| ( M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3 
| ( M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3 
| ( M ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3 
I (A 4( i  +  2 , 1  +  3 
| ( A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3
=  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) | ( A 4 ( i  +  2 , 1  +  3)
<  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) >  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) =  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) <  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) >  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) =  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) <  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) ,  
) >  A 4 ( i  +  l , i  +  2 ) ) ,  
=  A 4 ( i  +  1 , 1  +  2 ) ) . (5 .20 )
Finally, 72 (8x9) CP Features are produced by concatenating (||) all the 
elements from the above eight feature sets.
F cp  =  f  11 II f l2 1 /z3 1 /z4 1 fl5 1 //6 1 /z7 1 fl8 (5.22)
5.2 Experimentation Setup
The experimental setup is given in Table 5.1. To evaluate the performance of 
the CP Features on F5, a total of 4000 images from UCID and B 0W S2  image 
databases discussed previously in Section 3.2 were used. All images were cropped 
about the centre to 640x480 pixels, and then compressed with QF=80 in JPEG 
format.
Table 5.1: The experimentation setup
Task Description
Image Source UCID and B 0W S2  image database.
Object Preparation Grayscale, cropped to the centre of 
640x480 pixels.
Payload Random generated bits.
Payload Size Varied: 0.05 bpnc, 0.1 bpnc and 0.2 
bpnc.
Payload Embedding F5Py
Feature Extraction D CT Features, Markov Features and 
the proposed CP Features
Classifier LibSVM
Performance Heuristic Classification accuracy
For comparison purposes, another two steganalysis features, the D C T Features 
and Markov Features were implemented. To deal with the double compression 
issue, all the images were first undergone the F5 encoding process by using F5Py 
implementation as discussed in Section 4.3. The outputs were the sets of stego 
images based on the size of the embedded message. The message was a random
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generated bits with variable sizes, ranging from 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 bits per nonzero 
coefficient (bpnc) of the cover image. The average peak signal-to-noise ratio 
(PSNR) between the cover image set and its corresponding stego image sets are 
shown in Table 5.2. As the PSNR value decreased with the longer message lengths, 
the image quality also decreased in the same way.
Table 5.2: The average PSNR value between cover image set and its corresponding 
stego image sets, each with 0.05 bpnc, 0.1 bpnc and 0.2 bpnc message 
embedded accordingly.
Message Length
0.05 bpnc 0.1 bpnc 0.2 bpnc 
PSNR (dB) 42.51 38.90 34.47
W ith the cover and stego images available, 193 extended D C T Features, 81 
reduced Markov Features and proposed 72 CP Features were extracted from 
each image for the subsequent binary classification process. The extended D CT  
Features were the extension of 23 D CT Features proposed in [36] and the reduced 
Markov Features were the simplified version of 324 Markov Features proposed 
in [113]. These extension and reduction tasks were performed when the D CT  
Features were combined with Markov Features by Pevny and Fridrich in [100]. 
We will discuss further these tasks in Section 5.3.2. The LibSVM  [18] was then 
used as a classifier. The training and testing were performed by using ^easy.py 
tool that was available from the LibSVM  package. Training images were based 
on a random selection of 90% of the cover and stego image pairs. The remaining 
10% of the image pairs were used for classifier testing.
5.3 Results and Discussions
Figure 5.4 illustrates the plot on the difference between the value of individual 
element in CP Features [Fcp) of an image and CP Features from its corresponding 
stego images embedded with 0.05 bpnc {F^p^), 0.1 bpnc (F^p) and 0.2 bpnc (F^p) 
of message. We can see how the gap of the difference grows according to the 
increments in the size of the embedded message.
Different plots of CP Features in Figure 5.4 also shows tha t the variant of 
elements in DCT coefficient increases after the embedding process. The changes in 
values of CP Features can be seen especially for the case when the precondition and 
probabilities are considering the same value. From Equation 5.2 and Equation 5.3, 
this condition occurs when event A is r  =  ç and event B is p — q. The reason can 
be due to the properties of the DCT coefficient array where most of the values, 
especially in the lower left part of the 8x8 block of the DCT coefficients are 
typically zeros as illustrated in Figure 5.3. As such, the statistics calculated by 
using those values obtained from the proposed approach provided a large statistical 
value (eight lowest values in Figure 5.4) when event A is r  =  ç and event B is 
p = q îor all the different p, q and r locations.
The classification accuracy and its confidence interval at 95% confidence level 
can be seen in Figure 5.5. The classification accuracies are the arithmetic average
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Figure 5.4; Plot of the differences between CP Features from cover images and 
its corresponding stego images with 0.05 bpnc, 0.1 bpnc and 0.2 bpnc 
message embedded Fcp -  FS f ,Fcp -  %  and Fcp -
of 10 random experiments. Based on our discussion on confidence interval in 
Section 3.5.2, we can see that all the tested features are having a comparable 
performance since the confidence interval in all cases overlapped. In other words, 
there is no tested features which is statistically significance better or worse than 
the other.
However, CP Features provided the highest predicted classification accuracies 
among the tested features with an accuracy of 57.15% for message size of 0.05 
bpnc and accuracy of 70.08% for message size of 0.2 bpnc. However, for message 
size of 0.2 bpnc, Markov Features achieved the highest predicted classification 
accuracies of 88.6%, which is 0.53% higher than predicted classification accuracy 
by CP Features. In all the cases, DCT Features shown to be the least effective 
with the accuracies of 54.93%, 66.98% and 84.98% for message size of 0.005%, 
0.1% and 0.2%, respectively.
From the results, we can see that CP Features and Markov Features were very 
close in their performance. In particular, CP Features were shown to be more 
sensitive to embedding artifacts since it provided the highest classification accuracy 
in lower embedding rate cases (0.05 bpnc and 0.1 bpnc). Even though the CP 
Features did not provide the highest classification accuracies in all the cases, we 
observed from the experiment that CP Features achieved the acceptable results 
as new features in steganalysis of JPEG images. The following section will discus 
how the calibration technique helps in improving the performance of our proposed 
CP Features.
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5.3. Results and Discussions
5.3.1 CP Features Improvement Using Calibration 
Technique
In this section, we investigate at the possibility of improving the CP Features 
performance by using a calibration technique. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, 
the original calibration technique proposed in [33] subtracted the features of the 
examined image F{Ji) with its calibrated version F ( J2) as shown in Figure 5.6. 
The resultant features are the difference F (Ji) — F{J2) if F  is a scalar or the 
features are the L\ norm ||F (J i)  — F ( J 2) ||l i  if F  is a vector or matrix. The use of 
calibration technique has shown to increase the features’ sensitivity to embedding 
changes while decreasing features’ sensitivity to the image content [100].
JPEG Spatial Spatial
Original
exam ined
IDCT
Decom pressed
Image
A
image Crop
JPEG
C a lib r a te d  fe a tu r e  = F {J^ ) -  F (J ^  ) / ||F(J^ ) -  F (J2 )[A
Figure 5.6: Calibration technique as discussed in [33]; investigated image 
decompresses into its spatial domain using inverse DCT, crop by four 
pixels in vertical and horizontal, and recompresses using the same 
quantisation matrix of the investigated image.
In addition, calibration technique was used by Ker in [58] for the detection 
of LSB matching^ in colour bitmaps. Ker again used calibration technique for 
steganalysis of LSB matching but this time it was for grayscale images [59]. These 
two examples clearly demonstrated that calibration can be implemented in spatial 
domain even though it was initially proposed in the DCT transform domain for 
JPEG images.
Moreover, Pevny and Fridrich [100], replaced Li norm with the individual 
differences to avoid the loss of valuable steganalysis informations. This technique 
will be discussed further in Section 5.3.2. Kodovsky and Fridrich [69] proposed 
another modification in calibration approach where the features extracted from 
the calibrated image F ( J 2) were taken as additional features instead of being 
subtracted by their original features value F (A ). In other words, the final features 
set are the Cartesian product of the F (Ji) and F ( ^ ) .
To improve our proposed CP Features, we incorporate both the calibration 
techniques in generating the calibrated version of CP Features. Using 
Equation 5.22, we express the 72 calibrated CP Features set (CP Cali-Diff 
Features) as:
^LSB matching is as minor modification of the LSB replacement method. Matching retains the 
favorable characteristics of LSB replacement but is more difficult to detect statistically [58].
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jnCali-Diff _  jpCali-Diff 
^CP ~
pCali—Diff
^15
jpCali—Dif f 
1^2
rpCali—Dif f 
1^6
r^ Cali—Diff
^13
j^ Cali—Diff f :Cali-Diff18 (5.23)
and its 144 Cartesian product calibrated (CP Cali-Cart Features) set as:
Cali—Cart 
CP = F,CP
j^Cali-Diff
^CP (5.25)
Figure 5.7 illustrates the plot on the difference between the value of individual 
element in CP Features (Fcp) of an image and CP Features from its corresponding 
stego images embedded with 0.05 bpnc 0.1 bpnc and
0.2 bpnc (Fqp) of message. Having the same pattern as in Figure 5.4, again we 
can see how the gap of the difference grows according to the increments in the size 
of the embedded message.
0  ,0 5  b p c  
0 .1  b p c  
0 ,2  b p c
I
I<6
g
I
o
J
*o
£
I
o
CP Features
Figure 5.7: Plot of the differences between the calibrated CP Features from 
cover images and its corresponding stego images with 0.05 bpnc, 0.1 
bpnc and 0.2 bpnc message embedded ; Fcp — ,Fcp —
To illustrate the effect of calibration technique on CP Features, we plot the value 
of F-score for each element in CP Features set before (Fcp) and after 
the calibration process as shown in Figure 5.8. The use of F-score has already 
been discussed in Section 4.3.2. To recall, F-score gives an indication on how
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discriminative is the individual feature. A larger F-score means tha t the feature 
is more discriminative in the classification process.
Prom Figure 5.8 we can see that the calibration increases the F-Score values 
of the original CP Features. The mean value increases from 0.0015 in Fcp  to 
0.2409 in In addition, the plot displays that the features become more
discriminative after the calibration process especially when only the first half of 
the 72 features are considered.
The calibration results
The increments in discriminative properties (F-Score) of the features are then 
translated into the improvement in classification accuracy as shown in Figure 5.9. 
From the results, we can see how both calibration approaches; Difference of F{Ji) — 
F ( J 2 ) and Cartesian product of F{Ji) and F{J2) improved the performance of CP 
Features.
A significant improvement for both calibrations approaches can be seen for 
message size of 0.1 bpnc. An increments of 11.15% in classification accuracy was 
achived for while an increments of 13.87% was achieved by
As shown in Figure 5.9, the confidence intervals for both calibrated versions clearly 
do not overlapped with, the confidence interval of the original CP Features. As 
such, we conclude that with 95% confidence both the CP Cali-Diff Features and 
CP Cali-Cart Features are better than CP Features in this case. Also, a similar 
result was achieved for CP Cali-Cart Features with message size of 0.2 bpnc. As a 
result, with 95% confidence, CP Cali-Cart Features are better than CP Features.
Overall, the CP Cali-Cart Features achieved a better classification accuracy 
result as compared to CP Cali-Diff Features in all cases. CP Cali-Cart Features 
provides an improvement at average of 8.30% while for CP Cali-Diff Features the 
average is 6.29%.
The improvement of performance when merging the D CT feature and Markov 
Features in [100], will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
5.3.2 The Merger of DCT Features and Markov Features
In [100], Pevny and Fridrich proposed new steganalysis features formed by 
combining the extended D CT Features and reduced calibrated Markov Features. 
We first discuss the description of the extended D CT Features and the reduced 
Markov Features. Then we present the new merged feature sets as a combination 
of our proposed CP Features and the extended D CT Features.
Extended D C T  Features
The used of Li norm for reducing the dimensionality of D C T Features were 
discussed in Section 4.1.1. Li norm is essentially the sum of absolute values 
of all the vector or matrix elements. In other words, Li norm accumulate all the 
statistics into one single parameter (sum). It is possible that when accompanied 
by statistics that are less dominant, the statistics which should have a dominant 
effect suppressed and becomes less effective overall. To address the problem, they 
replaced the L i norm with the differences between (Ji) and {J2). For global
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(b) Calibrated CP Features with differential technique; Mean of F-Score =  0.2409
Figure 5.8: Plot of F-score for CP Features and its calibrated version on the 
investigated image with 0.2 bpnc message embedded. The features 
are sorted according to the value of F-score.
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histogram functional H  and 5 histogram of individual DCT modes {i,j)  G C, 
the differences are taken for elements in the range [-5,+5];
/ G { - 5 , 5 }  , (5.26)
and
~ I G {—5,..., 5} . (5.27)
For dual histogram functionals g^,d  G {—5, ...,+5}, the difference of 9 lowest 
AC modes are
9ij{Ji) -  9ij{J2), (%,j) G (2,1), (3,1), (4,1),
(1.2), (2,2), (3,2),
(1.3), (2,3), (1,4). (5.28)
For co-occurrence matrix functionals, the central elements in the range 
[-2,-l-2]x [-1,-^2] are used which yields 25 features
C'sf(Ji) — Cst{J2)i G [—2,4-2] X [—2,4-2]. (5.30)
W ith the replacement of Li norm by the above differences, the dimensionality 
of the features increased to 193. The list of functionals F  and its dimensionality 
are given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Extended DCT feature set
Functional Dimensionality
1 X  Global histogram Hi 11
5 X  AC histograms h f 5x11
11 X  Dual histograms gfj 11x9
1 X Variations V 1
2 X Blockiness 2
1 X Co-occurrence matrix Cst 25
Calibrated and reduced Markov Features
Referring to the previous discussion on Markov Features in Section 4.2.1, four 
transition probability matrices M/i, My, M^ and M ^  with the same dimensions 
9x9 produced a total of 324 features (4x81 =  324). In order to improve the 
features’ sensitivity to embedding, calibration was incorporated with Markov 
Features to generate the calibrated versions M ^ \  My^\ M^^ and Mm in [100].
If the calibrated Markov Features are combined directly with the extended 193 
DCT Features, it will then produce a relatively large 517 dimensional features 
vector. In order to reduce the number of features from the combination. Pevny 
and Fridrich decided that only the average M  = {M^^^-\-My^^+M^^^-\-Mm)/4: of 
all the calibrated Markov Features would be combined with the extended D C T
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Features. This combination produced a feature vector with dimensionality of 81 
which was then combined with the extended D CT Features resulting a merged 
feature set with dimensionality of 274 (193+81) which we refer as Markov-DCT 
Features in this thesis.
Markov-DCT Features have been shown to achieve a higher detection accuracy 
of 99.92% as compared to the individual D CT Features with 99.49% and Markov 
Features with 99.80% accuracy on F5 with 100% embedding capacity [100]. 
The latest work on Markov-DCT Features was performed by Kodovsky and 
Fridrich where the final features set was constructed as a Cartesian product of 
the Markov-DCT Features extracted from the original image and Markov-DCT 
Features extracted from the calibrated image. As the result, the detection error 
rates have decrease with an average of 0.02 for both F5 and JSteg. In the next 
section we discuss the combination of our proposed CP Features with the the 
extended D CT Features.
5.3.3 The merged of CP Features with DCT Features
In this section we investigate the performance of steganalysis when CP Features are 
combined with the extended D CT Features. The main reason of why the extended 
D CT Features have been selected for this combination was to incorporate the first 
order statistics from D CT Features alongside the second order statistics captured 
by CP Features. The global histogram, individual histogram and dual histogram 
are the first order statistics belonging to the D CT Features. These first order 
statistics have shown to be very effective in attacking F5 and Outguess [33]. The 
used of global histogram statistics alone has achieved a detection reliability^ of 
0.9936 and 0.8110 for fully embedded F5 and Outguess, respectively. Therefore, 
first order statistics which have been extended as discussed in Section 5.3.2 can be 
a complement to the CP Features leading to a better performance in steganalysis.
Table 5.4 summarises the different combinations between the CP Features 
and the extended D CT Features. In addition. This table also includes the 
combination of the reduced Markov Features and the extended D C T Features. The 
combination was performed using both approaches in calibration, the difference 
and the Cartesian product of F{Ji) and F{J2), producing two sets of features; 
the CP-DCT Cali-Diff Features and CP-DCT Cali-Cart Features. We compare 
the combined features to Markov-DCT Cali-Diff Features as proposed in [100] and 
Markov-DCT Cali-Cart Features presented in [69].
Even though the number of Markov Features has been reduced to 81, it 
was still larger than our proposed 72 CP Features. Therefore, the combined 
CP-DCT Cali-Diff Features are the smallest set with a total of 265 (72 +  193) 
features, followed by Markov-DCT Cali-Diff Features set with a total of 274 
(193 +  81) features. For the CP-DCT Cali-Cart Features and Markov-DCT 
Cali-Cart Features sets, the number of features is twice the number of features 
for CP-DCT Cali-Diff Features ((72 +  193) x 2 =  530) and Markov-DCT Cali-Diff 
Features ((193 +  81) x 2 =  548).
^As discussed in Section 3 .5 , detection reliability, p defined as p =  2A — 1, where A is the area 
under the ROC curve.
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Table 5.4: Combinations 
Features.
between CP Features, Markov Features and D CT
Features Set Discription Total Features
Markov-DCT Cali-Diff The merged of the extended D CT  
Features and the reduced Markov 
Features by using the difference 
of features value from original and 
calibrated image [100].
193 +  81 =  274
Markov-DCT Cali-Cart The merged of extended D CT  
Features and reduced Markov 
Features by using Cartesian 
product of features from original 
and calibrated image in [69].
(193+81) x2  =  
548
CP-DCT Cali-Diff The merged of CP Features and 
extended D CT Features by using 
the difference of features value from 
original and calibrated image.
72 +  193 =  265
CP-DCT Cali-Cart The merged of CP Features and 
extended D CT Features by using 
Cartesian product of features from 
original and calibrated image.
(72+193) x2  =
530
As a result, Figure 5.10 shows the performance outcomes from the combined 
features. Both the CP-DCT Cali-Diff Features and CP-DCT Cali-Cart Features 
displayed a better classification accuracy as compared to when they were used 
individually (Figure 5.5).
Moreover, the calibration using Cartesian product of F {Ji) and F {J2) also 
showed to achieve a better classification accuracy as compared to their difference 
in all the combination cases. These results matched the findings in [100] for 
calibration with Cartesian product and also correlated to results obtained in 
Section 5.25, with CP Cali-Cart Features achieved a better result as compared 
to CP Cali-Diff Features.
W ith an average of approximately 1.63% higher than the nearest performance 
by Markov-DCT Cali-Cart Features for all different message length cases, our 
new combined CP-DCT Cali-Cart Features were shown to outperform the 
other features in terms of classification accuracy. Although the performance 
of CP-DCT Cali-Diff Features were found to be lower than the Markov-DCT 
Cali-Cart Features, it still provided a better performance as compared to 
Markov-DCT Cali-Diff Features with an average improvement of approximately 
1.14%. Therefore we conclude that the combination of CP Features with the 
extended D CT Features contributed a better or at least a comparable performance 
to the Markov-DCT Features.
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5.4. Summary
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, CP Features have been introduced for steganalysis evaluation. 
With a hypothesis that F5 steganography technique leaves statistical artifacts 
on JPEG coefficient values, the CP Features has shown to be able to exploit 
those artifacts for the detection process. The CP Features was obtained by using 
conditional probability statistics that were able to record different patterns in the 
neighbouring pixels in DCT coefficient values of an JPEG image. Based on the 
confidence interval for the predicted accuracy, the CP Features were shown to have 
a comparable performance to the Markov Features and DCT Features in attacking 
F5. In addition, the CP Features also simplified the steganalysis process when the 
features were extracted directly from the DCT coefficient array.
With the use of two different calibration approaches during its extraction 
process, the CP Features performance was improved with a classification accuracy 
improvements of 4.13% by taking the difference of features sets from the original 
and calibrated images (CP Cali-Diff Features). A higher improvements of 
7.08% was achieved when their Cartesian product were considered (CP Cali-Cart 
Features). Moreover, the combination of CP Features and D CT Features 
{CP-DCT Cali-Diff)^ was shown to outperform the other feature combinations 
including the Markov-DCT Cali-Diff from [100] and Markov-DCT Cali-Cart from 
[69] with the highest classification accuracy of 99.6% for message size of 0.2 
bpnc. Continuing the discussion on CP Features, Chapter 6 will discuss its 
implementation in camera identification.
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6 D igital Image Source 
Identification Using CP 
Features
In Chapter 5, we introduced the CP Features for steganalysis. In this chapter, 
we extend and utilise CP Features for the purpose of camera identification in the 
field of image forensic. There are three main sections in this chapter.
In Section 6.1, we give a brief introduction to digital forensics. Following that, 
Section 6.2 specifically present the digital camera identification as one of the 
areas in digital forensics. The discussion includes various approaches proposed 
by researchers and the steganalysis features used in digital camera identification.
Section 6.3 introduces the use of our proposed CP Features for inter-camera 
model identification, particularly focusing on CP Features performance for the 
detection of image sources taken using four different cameras models. Furthermore, 
we highlight the performance of CP Features when the investigated images have 
been cropped and compressed. This test of robustness against image processing 
task is discussed in Section 6.3.1.
Finally, in Section 6.4, we extend the applicability of CP Features for 
intra-camera model identification. We also examine the CP Features performance 
for detection of image sources taken using four different iPhone mobile phone 
cameras. Similarly, we again highlight the use of CP Features to match the 
processed iPhone’s images with their source in order to test its reliability when 
the images have been cropped and compressed.
6.1 Digital Image Forensic
Digital images are widely used in today’s society due to the availability of 
a wide range of affordable digital cameras with different specifications and 
functions. Furthermore, the popularity of mobile phone devices equipped with 
image capturing capability such as the Apple iPhone contributes further to the 
generation, transmission and storage of digital images.
Digital images are being more frequently exhibited either directly or indirectly 
in court as an evidence for law enforcement [129]. However, the manipulation 
of digital images is made simple with easily available processing tools, making it 
harder to trust them. An obvious example related to the content of file headers 
has been pointed out in [80]. Exchangeable Image File (EXIF) header data, for 
examples, may contain information such as digital camera type, time taken and 
exposure as shown in Figure 6.1.
However, this information may not be present if, for example, the image is
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Casio3 Properties
Property 1 Vakie
Im a g e
. □  Width 3264 pixels
j □  Height 2448 pixels
r 1 Horizontal Resolution 72 dpi
Q  Vertical Resolution 72 dpi
Q  Bit Depth 24
t_3 F r^ e X o u a t — — — 
"{^Equipment Make CASIO COMPUTER CO.,LTD."~
» .H ) Camera Model EX-Z150
Q  CreatTSn Tbftware — -  — — iT^O— —
Q  Color Representation sRGB
! Q  Lens Aperture F/5.9
Q  Flash Mode
Q  Foc^ Length 19 mm
*~*l F-Number F/S.9
U  Eaposuic Time 1/60 sec.
, liO  Speed ISO-400
' U  Meteiing Mode Pattern
',lD  Light Source__________ Unknown
L
. .. J I . ] . . . .
(a) Sample image taken using (b) Corresponding EXIF information of image 
Casio camera. (a), the make and camera model details are
included.
Figure 6.1: EXIF information which are embedded into image captured using 
Casio digital cameras.
re-saved to a different file format. Indeed, it is possible that the information has 
been deliberately modified. In Figure 6.2, we can see how the changes can easily 
be done by using software packages such as ExifTool [51].
This is where the role of digital forensics becomes important; to ensure the 
integrity of the evidence is restored. Digital forensics helps by providing some 
essential information about an image, such as to tracing the source of a digital 
image to the device that captured it. This is known as ‘camera identification’.
6.2 Digital Camera Identification
Figure 6.3 illustrates the different stages of a typical image formation of a digital 
camera process as presented by Xu et al. in [134]. The process starts after 
light enters the camera. First, it goes through a lens system which control 
the mechanism such as exposure and focusing. To maximise the visible quality, 
the light then goes through a filter system which consists such as infra-red and 
anti-aliasing filters. Following the filter system, the light then reach colour filter 
array (CFA), which is a mosaic of color filters that block out a certain portion of 
the spectrum, allowing each pixel to detect only one specific colour. The output 
then becomes an input into a charge-coupled device (CCD) sensor by which it is 
transferred to electric signals. Finally, image processor fulfills the tasks like color
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Figure 6.2: EXIF’s make and camera model information changed by using ExifTool 
software package [51].
interpolation, image sharpening and image compression to produce a high quality 
digital image.
With regards to the typical image formation process, few methods have been 
proposed for some of the stages. Much research has focused on the identification 
of a unique fingerprint that can be used to link the image to the source camera. 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the camera detection techniques related to the 
image formation stages.
Output
Image
Lens Filters
Digital
Image
Processor
Colour
Filter
Array
(CFA)
CCD
Sensors
Figure 6.3: Different stages of a typical image formation of a digital camera process 
as presented in [134].
The research by Geradts et al. [40] can be considered as one of the pioneering 
works in camera identification. The identification is based on the characteristics of 
the digital camera such as the file formats, defective pixel locations and the noise 
level. However, Kharrazi et al. [63], indicated that this technique might require 
information that could only be gathered from the original camera.
In work by Lukas et al. [80], camera sensors were shown to produce noise
6.2. Digital Camera Identification
Table 6.1: Image source identification in different image formation stages
Stage Author (s) Methods No. of 
camera
Lens Choi et al [24] Footprints from lens 
aberration
3
Filtering Bayram et al 
110]
Differences in CFA and colour 
interpolation algorithms
3
Swaminathan et 
al [121]
Differences in CFA and colour 
interpolation algorithms
19
CCD Filler et al [31] Photo response non uniformity 
units (PRNU)
17
Lukâs et a l [80] Sensor pattern noise 9
Li [74] Sensor pattern noise 6
DIP Choi et al [23] JPEC compression features; 
bits per pixel & percentage of 
non-zero in DCT
4
Output Kharrazi et al Features from spatial and 5
Image [63] wavelet domain
Xu et al [134] Markovian transition 
probability matrix features
8
patterns (sensor pattern noise) that could result in unique signatures. However, 
it has been demonstrated by Li in [74] that the sensor pattern noise extracted 
from images can be severely contaminated by details from natural scenes. To deal 
with this issue, a novel approach for reducing the influence of natural scenes by 
assigning weighting factors inversely proportional to the magnitude of the sensor 
pattern noise components was proposed by Li [74]. As a result, a maximum 
improvement of 18% on the true positive rate was achieved with the smallest image 
size (128 X128), while a minimum improvement of 1% achieved on the larger image 
size (1536x2048).
Another approach which employed statistical process control (SPC) charts on 
image variations has been introduced by Bateman et al in [9]. In their paper, 
the charts provided a tool to detect anomalies in image data. The statistical 
differences provided an informal scheme to relate the image with the device type. 
They found a clear distinction between images from low-end cameras (where the 
degree of variation was approximately 21%), and mid-range cameras (where the 
degree of variation was approximately 1%).
Steganalysis Features in Digital Camera Identification
Besides the previously discussed camera identification techniques in Section 6.2, we 
also found some examples where steganalysis features have been used for camera 
identification [63] [134]. In steganalysis, the main objective of the features is to 
capture the artifacts caused by some embedding process on the stego image. 
Similarly, in camera identification the objective is still the same, which is to
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capture any artifacts from the image. The distinction however, is the source 
of the artifacts. In camera identification, the artifacts were mainly caused by the 
processes involved in the digital image formation process.
An early work on camera identification by using steganalysis features was 
performed by Kharrazi et al. in [63]. In their experiment, each image was 
represented by 34 features extracted from its spatial and wavelet domain. The 
wavelet domain features were previously discussed in Section 3.3. Their method 
achieved detection accuracy between 78% and 95% when classifying images from 
5 different cameras.
Besides steganalysis, Markov Features were used by Xu et al. [134] to identify 
the camera-model for capturing an image. In their work, Markov Features were 
demonstrated to be able to classify images taken from 8 camera models, with 
an average accuracy of 92.5%. Their work demonstrated tha t Markov Features 
could be applied to camera-model identification as an addition to their use in 
steganalysis [113][100].
6.3 Inter-Camera Model Image Source 
Identification
Two types of experiments were defined by Gloe et al. [42], the inter-camera 
model and intra-camera model classification. Inter-camera model classification 
considering images taken by cameras of different brand or model, while, 
intra-camera model classification examines images from the same brand and model 
cameras. In this section, we cover the inter-camera model classification while the 
intra-camera model classification are discuss in Section 6.4.
Dresden Image Database for Digital Image Forensics
The availability of a common dataset is very important for detailed experimental 
comparative analysis. It allows results to be reproduced and compared in the 
design and development of better algorithms. Recently, the Dresden Image 
Database^ [41] has been created and currently is available on-line for forensic 
research. It contains over 14,000 images captured by 73 different camera models. 
This database includes natural scenes comprised from indoor and outdoor scenes. 
Sample images from the Dresden Image Database are shown in Figure 6.4. To 
date, the Dresden Image Database has been used in [67], [66], [55] and [108].
Tasks
To evaluate the performance of CP Features in camera identification, a subset 
of images from the Dresden Image Database [41] was used. All the images are 
kept at their default size and in their native JPEG file format. The subset 
includes both, typical consumer digital cameras and digital single-lens reflex 
(SLR) semi-professional camera images. Table 6.2 shows the basic specifications 
of the four camera models used to capture the images. W ith the images
^Accessible via: h t t p : / / f o r e n s ic s . in f  .tu -dresden.de/dresden_im age_database/
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Figure 6.4: Samples of indoor and outdoor scenes in the Dresden Image Database.
available, CP Features are then extracted from each of the images for the 
subsequent classification process using LibSVM[lS] as a classifier. A summary 
of the experimentation setup is shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.5 shows the 
corresponding work flow of our experiment.
Table 6.2: List of cameras used to capture the subset of images from Dresden 
Image Database in our work.
Device Model Resolution [Pixel]
Casio EX-Z150 3264x2448
Kodak M1063 3664x2748
Nikon S Coolpix S710 4352x3264
Nikon D D200 2872x2592
Table 6.3: The experimentation setup
Task Description
Image Source Dresden Image Database
Object Preparation Colour image at their default size and 
in JPEC image format
Feature Extraction The proposed CP Features
Classifier LibSVM
Performance Heuristic Confusion matrix and classification 
accuracy
In our experiment, a total of 100 images per device were used. Multi-class 
classification was performed by using the LibSVM  classifier. The classifier was 
first trained with 90 randomly chosen images from each device and the remaining 
10 images were then used for testing. The independent training and testing steps 
were repeated 10 times.
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C asio Kodak NikonS NikonD
Im age S am ples
T est Im agesTraining Im ages
F ea tu res
Extraction
F ea tu res
Extraction
T est F ea tu resTraining Featu res,
Classification
(SVM)
Classification
Model
Training
Classification A ccuracy 
(Confusion Matrix)
Figure 6.5: Experiment workflow.
Experiment Results
To draw the different between images of different cameras, we decided to plot the 
average CP Features values extracted from images of each camera. As a result, 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the plot of average CP Features values for Casio {Fqp^°), 
Kodak (Fqp^^^), NikonS {F^p^J^^) and NikonD {F^p^^^) images of our image 
subset. For n  images from each different camera models in our experiment, the 
average CP Features for speciflc camera is:
TiCasio 
CPa
Casio 
C P  n (6 .1)
1 "jpKadak   \  '' Kodak
^CPavg -  -  Z ^ ^ C P  n 
^  i= l
(6.2)
NikonS 
CPc
1 ”
i= l
NikonS
C P (6.3)
jp NikonD  
^ C P a v g
i= l
NikonD (6.4)
In addition, the average absolute difference between the four sets of average 
are included. The average absolute difference provide some statistical information
93
6.3. Inter-Camera Model Image Source Identification
N ik o n D  
A v g . D iff.
®  0 . 5
C P  F ea tu res
Figure 6.6: Plot of . For
the value of mean =  0.0592, variance =  0.0056, maximum =  0.2738 
and minimum = 0.0074.
on how different are the values of CP Features between the four cameras. Its 
mean gives the average of the differences, its variance presents the spread of the 
differences while the maximum and minimum show the range of the differences 
between the CP Features of different cameras. For every element j  of F§p^^°, 
pKodak  ^ jpN^konS pN^onD^ the average absolute difference is:
p A v g D if f
J -  +  fj) (6.5)
where.
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Qin --
C-i =
rpCasio jpKodak 
^C Pavgj ~  ^CPavg 3
iCasio
C P
F,Kodak
NikonD
C P
?NikonD
C P C P
, bj =
dj =
iCasio
C P
iKodakCB
iNikonS
NikonS  
CB
?NikonS
C P
iNikonD
C P C P
From Figure 6.6, we can see clear differences between the plots of each device. 
Each camera yields a different pattern in their plot. Although the typical image 
formation as shown in Figure 6.3 can be seen as a standard operation, the actual 
processing can be relatively different for each manufacturer and even for the 
different camera models of the same brand. For example, we notice each of the 
cameras in our experiment is using a different quantisation table as shown in 
Table 6.4. In JPEG compression, quantisation is one of the main stages where 
8 x 8  block of DCT coefficients are divided by a quantisation table and then 
followed by a rounding process. When a different quantisation table is used in 
the quantisation process, a statistical difference also can be seen in the quantised 
block of DCT coefficients. This statistical difference is essentially detected by the 
CP Features as shown in Figure 6.6. In addition, the colour interpolation^ process 
can also cause a statistical difference in blocks of DCT coefficients as discussed 
by Long et al. in [78]. These are examples of the processes tha t might have 
contributed to the different statistics on the resultant image of a different camera 
model.
Table 6.5 shows the confusion matrix for 10 independent tests and the 
subsequent plots of individual confusion matrices are displayed in Figure 6.7. As 
shown in Table 6.5, each row represents 100 randomly selected images (10 images 
X 10 tests) originating from the camera that corresponds to the ’predicted’ device 
with the same name. Every time a certain image is classified with a source camera, 
its corresponding entry will be raised by one. In addition, the diagonal elements 
represent the correct classification. The classification accuracy is then calculated 
by dividing the number of correct classification with total number of identification 
for each row. Finally, the average classification accuracy is calculated from all of 
the calculated classification accuracies, as follows:
Classification Accuracy = Correct Classification 
Total Number of Identification (6.6)
Average of Classification Accuracy = Y2 Correct Classification (6.7)
Total Number of Camera 
From Figure 6.7, the use of CP Features achieved a classification accuracy of
^Colour interpolation is the process of interpolating the other colour for a pixel from its 
neighbouring samples after the color filters (CFA) block out a certain portion of the spectrum 
in image formation process.
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Table 6.4: Quantisation table of cameras used in our work.
Device Q uantisation Table: Luminance Quantisation Table: Chrominance
Casio
Kodak
Nikon S
Nikon D
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 ■ 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 -
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
. 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 .
r ^ 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 r 4 4 4 6 5 6 11 6 1
3 3 4 4 4 4 6 9 6 11 23 15 13 15 23 23
6 6 5 5 6 11 8 9 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
7 9 13 12 14 14 13 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
13 13 15 17 21 18 15 16 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
20 16 13 13 18 25 19 20 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
22 23 24 24 24 14 18 26 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
. 28 26 23 28 21 23 24 23 . . 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 .
1 1 1 1 2 3 3 - ■ 1 1 1 2 6 6 6 6 -
1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 6 6 6 6
1 1 1 1 2 3 4 3 1 1 3 6 6 6 6 6
1 1 1 1 3 5 4 3 2 4 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 1 2 3 4 6 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 2 3 3 5 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
3 3 4 5 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 . . 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 .
■ 4 6 5 8 12 20 26 31 ] - 4 9 12 24 50 50 50 50 ■
6 6 7 10 13 29 30 28 9 11 13 33 50 50 50 50
7 7 8 12 20 29 35 28 12 13 28 50 50 50 50 50
7 9 11 15 26 44 40 31 24 33 50 50 50 50 50 50
9 11 19 28 34 55 52 39 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
12 18 28 32 41 52 57 46 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
25 32 39 44 52 61 60 51 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
. 36 46 48 49 56 50 52 50 . 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 .
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Table 6.5: The confusion matrices and average classification accuracy for 10 
independent tests on subset images from Dresden Image Database with 
CP Features.
Predicted
Casio Kodak NikonS NikonD
Casio 99% 0% 0% 1%
Kodak 0% 100% 0% 0%
NikonS 0% 0% 99% 1%
NikonD 0% 0% 0% 100%
Average 99.5%
100% in 8 out of 10 tests conducted. The Kodak and NikonD test images are 
correctly identified in all of the tests. However, the classification for Casio and 
NikonS has resulted in one of test images from both cameras being misclassified 
as NikonD image during one of the tests.
6.3.1 Camera Identification for Processed Images
We have demonstrated the effectiveness of CP Features in image source 
identification using the original captured images. Next, we further extend the 
use of CP Features by considering that the image under investigation has been 
processed. There are a few examples of process such as scaling, rotating, cropping 
and compressing. In particular, we focus on the crop and compression processes 
since it has been reported in [43] that most people were satisfied with the cropping 
or resizing of images to a smaller scale before sending them via e-mail or for 
archiving.
In our analysis, we cropped the images into half of their original size followed by 
JPEC compression with QF=80 using Matlab 8.0 software. Indeed, compressing 
the images with the same QF will ensure the same quantisation table as shown 
in Table 6.6 being used for each of the image. Figure 6.8 illustrates a plot of 
average CP Features value for the processed images
and From the plots in Figure 6.8, we can see tha t the specific plot
pattern for each camera associated with the original image has been suppressed 
after the cropping and compressing operation. All plots follow the same pattern, 
with different values for each features of different cameras. In addition, the 
standard deviation value has decreased from 0.0056 for F^p^f^^^ to 0.00032921 
for p^'^sCiffcc ^ This smaller standard deviation value of p^'^sDiffcc gj^ows tha t
^ ■ ^ a v g  ^ t ^ a v g
the variation between the CP Features of different cameras also becomes smaller 
after the cropping and compressing operation.
Table 6.7 shows the confusion matrices for 10 independent tests and the 
subsequent plots of individual confusion matrices are displayed in Figure 6.9. From 
the results, we can see that the average classification accuracy has decreased from 
99.5% to 97.7%. Images from Casio and NikonD achieved the lowest classification 
accuracy at 97%. One of the Kodak images was also misclassified as a NikonD’ 
image while two NikonS images are misclassified as Casio’s and NikonD’ images.
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(a)
1 ;C asio , 2 ;K odak. 3 ;N ikonS , 4:NikonD 1:C as io ,2 ;K o d ak ,3 ;N ik o n S ,4 :N ik o nD
P red ic ted
(b)
Test 1, one Casio image misclassified Test 2,4 ,5 ,6,7 ,8,9 and 10, 100%
as NikonD image. classification accuracy.
1 :C asio , 2 :K odak, 3: N ikonS. 4:NikonD
P redicted
Test 3 , one NikonS image misclassified 
as NikonD image.
Figure 6.7: Confusion matrices for 10 independent tests on subset images from 
Dresden Image Database. 8 out of 10 tests demonstrated a 100% 
classification accuracy and 2 out of 10 tests (Test 1 and Test 3) achieved 
an accuracy of 97.5%.
Table 6.6: Quantisation table of image saved with QF=80 in Matlab.
Quantisation Table: Luminance Quantisation Table: Chrominance
- 6 4 4 6 10 16 20 24 ■ ■ 7 7 10 19 40 40 40 40 ■
5 5 6 8 10 23 24 22 7 8 10 26 40 40 40 40
6 5 6 10 16 23 28 22 10 10 22 40 40 40 40 40
6 7 9 12 20 35 32 25 19 26 40 40 40 40 40 40
7 9 15 22 27 44 41 31 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
10 14 22 26 32 42 45 37 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
20 26 31 35 41 48 48 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
. 29 37 38 39 45 40 41 40 . . 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 .
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♦■■■■Avg. D iff.
C P  F ea tu res
Figure 6.8: Plot of ■ The
specific pattern for each camera in original image has been suppressed 
after the cropping and compressing task. For  ^ the value
of mean =  0.0141, variance =  0.00032921, maximum =  0.0736 and 
minimum =  0.0012.
respectively. With a similar plot pattern as shown in Figure 6.8 and less variation 
between the CP Features of different cameras, this lower classification accuracy 
was expected. Although there is a decrease in the average classification accuracy, 
CP Features are still shown to provide some insight info on their robustness to 
image distortions such as cropping and compression shown in this experiment. In 
the next section, we will examine the durability of CP Features when the images 
are further cropped into smaller sizes and compressed with lower quality factors.
6.3.2 Robustness Performance of CP Features 
Cropping
With regards to the previous discussion on the processed images, we further crop 
the images to |  and |  of their original size to study the robustness on CP Features
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1 :C asio . 2:K odak, 3: N ikonS. 4:NikonD l:C as io .2 :K o d ak .3 :N ik o n S .4 :N ik o nO
6
2
0
(a)
Test 1 and Test 2, one Casio image 
misclassified as NikonS image.
(b)
Test 3, one NikonS image misclassified 
as NikonD image and one Kodak 
image misclassified as Casio image.
1:C asio , 2: K odak, 3: N ikonS, 4:NikonD 1 :C asio , 2:K odak, 3 ;N ikonS , 4:NikonD
P redicted Pred ic ted
(c) (d)
Test 5 and Test 6, one NikonD image Test 7, one NikonS image misclassified
misclassified as NikonS image. as Casio image.
1:C asio , 2 :K odak, 3 ;N ikonS , 4;NikonD 1 :C as !0 ,2: Kodak, 3 ; N ikonS. 4:NikonD
i<Pi'
P red ic ted
(e ) (f)
Test 8, one Casio image misclassified Test 4, 9 and 10, 100% classification 
as NikonS image and one Kodak image accuracy, 
misclassified as NikonD image.
Figure 6.9: Confusion matrices for 10 independent tests on processed images with 
average classification accuracy of 97.75%.
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Table 6.7; The confusion matrices and average classification accuracy for 10 
independent tests on processed images with CP Features
Predicted
Casio Kodak NikonS NikonD
Casio 97% 0% 3% 0%
Kodak 0% 99% 0% 1%
NikonS 1% 0% 98% 1%
NikonD 0% 1% 2% 97%
Average 97.75%
as shown in Figure 6.10. In addition, the 23 DCT Features [36] and the 324 Markov 
Features [113] are included for comparison purposes. As discussed previously, 
Markov Features set had already been used for camera identification by Xu et ai 
in [134].
QF=80
QF=60
QF=40
Exam ine
Figure 6.10: Experiment workflow for further cropped and compressed image. For 
cropping, images are cropped to |  and |  of their original size. 
For compressing, images are compressed with QF=80, QF=60 and 
QF=40. The cropped to |  and saved in QF=80 processes are the 
same processes discussed in Section 6.3.1.
The resultant performance for further cropped images is illustrated in Table 6.8. 
In general, CP Features outperform Markov Features and D C T Features, in all 
the different cropping cases. The results indicate that CP Features are the most 
robust as compared to the other two features sets. The average classification 
accuracy for CP Features has decreased from 97.75% for images cropped to  ^ of 
their original size to 96.5% and 92.25% for images cropped to |  and |  of their 
original size, respectively. In particular, these classification accuracy changes can 
be linked to the decreasing mean, variance and range (maximum - minimum) for 
overall values of CP Features as given in Table 6.9. The lower CP feature values 
are due to the cropping process which has removed parts of the elements (DCT
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coefficients) used to generate the CP Features. As a result, the smaller values of 
CP Features have caused the effectiveness of CP Features to decrease along with 
their robutness on cropping process.
Markov Features have achieved a comparable performance with CP Features 
for the images that were cropped to |  of their size. In this case, the average 
classification accuracy of Markov Features obtained was 97%, just 0.75% lower 
than the CP Features. However this average classification accuracy difference is 
larger when the images are cropped further into |  and |  of their original size with 
the differences of 2.25% and 5%, respectively. Moreover, the average classification 
accuracies at 90.75%, 79.75% and 69.75% were achieved for images cropped to 
f and | ,  respectively, D CT Features achieved the lowest in the performance on 
further cropped images.
Compression
The different camera models may have their own quantisation schemes with 
regards to the image quality factor [24]. Specifically, according to Pevny and 
Pridrich, [96], JPEG compression uses a set of quantisation tables indexed by 
a quality factor from the set of {1,2,..., 100}. We further JPEG compress the 
images with QF=60 and QF=40 to study the robustness of CP Features for images 
compressed with different quality factors as shown in Figure 6.10.
In Section 6.3, we have shown that each of the camera in our experiment 
was using a different quantisation table. Here, we found that software process 
also using a different quantisation table for specific image quality. For example, 
Table 6.10 shows the different quantisation tables for images saved with QF=60 
and QF=40 in our experiment.
The classification results for further compressed images are given in Table 6.11. 
In general, we can see the performance for all the feature sets has decreased, 
but not as significantly as the further cropped images. Again, the CP Features 
outperform Markov Features and D CT Features for different compression quality 
factors, with slightly better classification accuracy than the cropped image case. 
Its classification accuracy has decreased from 97.75% for images with QF=80 to 
95.5% for images compressed with QF=60 and further decreased to 93.25% for 
images compressed with QF=40. The main reason for the decrease in performance 
can be explained if we examine the plot of the average values for CP Features in 
Figure 6.11.
The gap between the plots of different cameras is getting narrower with smaller 
QFs. This will cause the classification process more difficult. In addition, the 
decrease in performance can be related to the decreasing value for most of the 
elements in CP Features, as shown in Figure 6.11. The lower CP Features values 
are due to the compression process which introduces more zeros in the DCT 
coefficients array used to generate the CP Features. W ith more zeros in the DCT 
coefficients array, it meant less variations can be detected by the CP Features and 
this will affect its performance.
From results in Table 6.11, Markov Features achieved a slightly lower 
performance as compared to CP Features for all cases. The average classification 
accuracy of Markov Features decreased from 97% for QF=80 to 93.2% and
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Table 6.9: The mean, variance, maximum and minimum of the overall values for 
CP Features on images cropped to |  and  ^ of their original size.
1
2
1
4
1
8
Mean 0.1110 0.1110 0.1109
Variance 0.0416 0.0395 0.0382
Maximum 0.7296 0.7169 0.7087
Minimum 0.0035 0.0038 0.0039
Table 6.10: Quantisation table of image saved with QF=60 and QF=40 in Matlab.
QF Quantisation Table: Luminance Quantisation Table: Chrominance
QF=60
QF=40
13 9 13 19 32 41 49 1
10 10 11 15 21 46 48 44
11 10 13 19 32 46 55 45
11 14 18 23 41 70 64 50
14 18 30 45 54 87 82 62
19 28 44 51 65 83 90 74
39 51 62 70 82 97 96 81
58 74 76 78 90 80 82 79
14 17 21
- 20 14 13 20 30 50 64 76 ■ - 21 23 30
15 15 18 24 33 73 75 69 23 26 33
18 16 20 30 50 71 86 70 30 33 70
18 21 28 36 64 109 100 78 59 83 124
23 28 46 70 85 136 129 96 124 124 124
30 44 69 80 101 130 141 115 124 124 124
61 80 98 109 129 151 150 126 124 124 124
. 90 115 119 123 140 125 129 124 . . 124 124 124
38 79 79 79 79
53 79 79 79 79
79 79 79 79 79
79 79 79 79 79
79 79 79 79 79
79 79 79 79 79
79 79 79 79 79
79 79 79 79 79 -
59 124 124 124 124 1
83 124 124 124 124
124 124 124 124 124
124 124 124 124 124
124 124 124 124 124
124 124 124 124 124
124 124 124 124 124
124 124 124 124 124 .
91.25% for QF=60 and QF=40, respectively. Moreover, the average classification 
accuracies at 90.75%, 87.75% and 80.25% for QF=80, QF=60 and QF=40 were 
achieved with D C T Features. Once again, D CT Features were the lowest in terms 
of the performance on further compressed images similar to previous cases shown 
for further cropped images.
Therefore, we conclude that the CP Features are the most robust features as 
compared to the other two feature sets in dealing with the images tha t have 
been cropped into different sizes or compressed with different quality factors. In 
addition, the experimental results indicate that the cropping process creates more 
problems as compared to compression process in image source identification for 
the processed images. In other words, images that have been compressed, are 
easier to be matched with their source instead of the cropped images.
6.3.3 CP Features in Spatial Domain
CP Features have been proposed to operate in the frequency domain where the 
features are extracted from the JPEG DGT coefficients array. Considering that 
images may also be captured or saved in different formats such as Portable 
Network Graphics (PNG) and bitmap (BMP), we propose the implementation 
of CP Features in the spatial domain, where features are extracted from the pixels
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C a s io  Q F = 8 0  
K o d a k  Q F = 8 0  
N ik o n S  Q F = 8 0  
N ik o n D  Q F = 8 0  
C a s io  Q F = 6 0  
K o d a k  Q F = 6 0  
N ik o n S  Q F = 6 0  
-  N ik o n D  Q F = 6 0  
C a s io  Q F = 4 0  
K o d a k  Q F = 4 0  
N ik o n S  O F - 4 0  
N ik o n D  Q F = 4 0
C P  F ea tu res
Figure 6.11: The plot of the average value for CP Features on images compressed 
with QF=80, QF=60 and QF=40. All the images with the related 
compression quality factors from the four cameras were used for this 
purpose.
value of an image. By extracting the features in the spatial domain, we make CP 
Features to be independent from the image format. Thus, CP Features become 
more versatile for a real world implementation.
We display the outcome of this approach in Figure 6.12 by plotting the average 
values for CP Features. The features have been extracted from the pixel values 
of the images that have been cropped to |  of their original size and converted to 
PNG and BMP formats. The different pattern for each camera can be seen very 
clearly from these plots. This may explain the very good classification accuracy of 
100% for all the 10 independent conducted tests as given in Table 6.12. Therefore, 
even though the images have been cropped and saved in a different formats, the 
results have confirmed that the CP Features are still effective in matching those 
images with their source in the spatial domain.
io 6
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— *•—  Casio 
i Kodak 
—e —  NikonS 
— ♦— NikonD 
» Avg. Diff.
0) 0  15
C P  F e a tu re s
Figure 6.12: Subplot of average values for CP Features values extracted 
from spatial domain of PNG images from four different
jTiC asiO S p a t i a l  odük $  p a t ia l  S p a t ia l  jp ^ ik o n D  S p a t i a l  ^
C/CXlXldr<Xo J X p   ^ Jl  ^ p  5 C P  5 C P  ctlXCJ.
F,AvgDiffSpatialCP.
6.4 Intra-Camera Model Image Source  
Identification
In the previous section we have discussed in detail the performance and robustness 
of CP Features in inter-camera model image identification. In this section, 
we discuss the performance of CP Features for intra-camera model image 
identification.
6.4.1 Experimentation Setup
To evaluate the performance of the CP Features in intra-camera model 
identification, we focus on the iPhone cameras and use the image set created 
by Bateman et al. in [9]. Sample images are displayed in Figure 6.13. The main 
reason on why this image set has been selected is because of the fixed setting of 
the devices (iPhone) used to capture the images. With fixed resolution and no 
zooming capability, we can avoid any possible difference due to error correction 
and image enhancement processes. The experimentation setup is shown in Table 
6.13.
All the images are kept at their default size (1600x1200) and in JPEG  image
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Table 6.12; The confusion matrix for camera identification for PNG and BMP 
images.
PNG BMP
Predicted 
Gasio Kodak NikonS NikonD
Predicted 
Gasio Kodak NikonS NikonD
Casio 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Kodak 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
NikonS 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
NikonD 0 % 0% 0% 100% 0 % 0% 0% 100%
Figure 6.13: Sample of images from Bateman et al [9]
U
format. With the images available, CP Features are then extracted from each 
of the images for the subsequent classification process using LibSVM [18] as 
a classifier. In our experiment, a total of 100 images per device were used. 
Multi-class classification was performed by using the LibSVM  classifier. The 
classifier was first trained with 90 randomly chosen images from each device and 
the remaining 10 images were then used for testing. The independent training and 
testing steps were repeated for 10 times.
6.4.2 Results and Discussions
Figure 6.14 illustrates the plot of the average values of CP Features for the images 
from four iPhone used in our experiment. Since we are comparing the same 
model of camera, we can see clearly how the plots from different iPhones are 
very similar in their patterns. This is expected since all the cameras are using
io 8
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Table 6.13: The experimentation setup
Task Description
Image Source Images by Bateman et al. [9]
Feature Extraction CP Features
Classifier LibSVM
Performance Heuristic Confusion matrix and classification accuracy
the same quantisation table as shown in Table 6.14. As such, intra-camera model 
image source identification is considered more challenging as compared to the 
inter-camera model identification as previously discussed in Section 6.3.
—X— Iphone #1 
— I— Iphone #2 
—K>~ Iphone #3 
— — Iphone #4 
■•■■♦■■■■Avg. Diff.
a.
Ü
(0
I
CP Features
Figure 6.14: The plot of the average values for CP Features on images from four 
different IPhone cameras.
In our experiment, we start by classifying images for two iPhone cameras. The 
CP Features achieved a very good performance by perfectly classifying the test 
images (100% classification accuracy) to their source. The corresponding confusion 
matrices is given in Table 6.15.
However, when the number of iPhone camera was increased in the experiment, 
the performance decreased to an average of 96.7% for three iPhones cameras, 
and 91.5% when four iPhone cameras were tested. The corresponding confusion 
matrices for each case are given in Table 6.16 and Table 6.17.
The decrease in performance is expected due to the additional number of classes, 
which makes the multi-class classification more difficult. In the case of four 
cameras, an average classification accuracy of approximately 91.5% was achieved 
in this experiment as compared to the performance of CP Features 99.5% which
log
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Table 6.14: Quantisation table of image captured with iPhone.
Quantisation Table: Luminance Quantisation Table: Chrominance
■ 4 3 2 4 6 10 12 15 ■ ■ 4 4 6 11 24 24 24 24 -
3 3 3 5 6 14 14 13 4 5 6 16 24 24 24 24
3 3 4 6 10 14 17 13 6 6 13 24 24 24 24 24
3 4 5 7 12 21 19 15 11 16 24 24 24 24 24 24
4 5 9 13 16 26 25 18 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
6 8 13 15 19 25 27 22 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
12 15 19 21 25 29 29 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
. 17 22 23 24 27 24 25 24 . . 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 .
Table 6.15: The confusion matrices for two iPhone camera identification.
Predicted
iPhone # 1  iPhone # 2
iPhone #1 100% 0%
iPhone # 2 0% 100%
Average 100%
Table 6.16: The confusion matrices for three iPhone camera identification.
Predicted
iPhone #1 iPhone # 2  iPhone # 3
iPhone #1 90% 0% 10%
iPhone # 2 0% 100% 0%
iPhone # 3 0% 0% 100%
A verage 96.7%
Table 6.17: The confusion matrices for four iPhone camera identification.
Predicted
iPhone # 1  iPhone # 2  iPhone # 3  iPhone # 4
iPhone #1 84% 0% 5% 11%
iPhone # 2 0% 100% 0% 0%
iPhone # 3 0% 0% 97% 3%
iPhone # 4 10% 0% 5% 85%
A verage 91.5%
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was much higher for inter-camera model discussed in Section 6.3.
Performance with processed images
We further examine the performance of CP Features with the processed images. 
In our experiment, we crop the images into half of their original size (800x600) 
and JPEG compressed with quality factor of 80 using Matlab 8.0 software similar 
to our previous experimental setup as presented in Section 6.3.1. The outcome of 
the classification process is given in Table 6.18.
Table 6.18: The average classification accuracy for cropped and compressed iPhone 
images.
D CT Markov CP
Features Features Features
2 iPhone 88.50% 97.50% 98.50%
3 iPhone 79.67% 93.67% 95.33%
4 iPhone 69.25% 87.25% 89.75%
CP Features are again shown to outperform the Markov Features and D CT  
Features in all cases, for different number of iPhone cameras. The results reiterated 
that CP Features are the most robust as compared to the other two feature sets.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we investigated the camera identification problem by using a limited 
number of camera models. We developed a new approach to the problem of 
inter-camera model identification from images. We analysed the reliability of CP 
Features for inter-camera model identification using the original and processed 
images. Experimental results were evaluated based on classification accuracy. By 
using four cameras, we demonstrated that the CP Features were able to perfectly 
match the test images with their source in 8 out of 10 independent tests conducted. 
Additionally, the CP Features were able to achieve the average classification 
accuracy of 97.75% on cropped and compressed test images. Moreover, CP 
Features were shown to work in the spatial domain when it was able to perfectly 
match the test images with their source in all the 10 independent tests conducted 
for images in PNG and BMP format.
Furthermore, by using four different iPhone cameras, we extended our work 
to the problem of intra-camera model identification. From the experiments we 
proved that the CP Features were still reliable from the classification accuracy 
performance for both the original and processed images. When only two iPhones 
were analysed, the CP Features were shown to provide a very good performance 
resulted in perfectly classifying all the test images according to their source. The 
results obtained in this chapter have provided a good indication of the usefulness 
and feasibility of CP Features in camera identification and potentially could 
further lead to the practical implementation in real-world application.
I l l
7 Conclusion and Future  
Research
7.1 Summary
The primary focus of this dissertation is to study the current approaches of 
steganalysis, examining for artifacts and designing a practical solution to counter 
it. Figure 7.1 illustrates the discussed research works and our findings, together 
with its position with regards to machine learning based steganalysis phases, 
discussed in Section 3.1.
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Figure 7.1: Thesis findings and contributions. Review of current techniques: 
different image source, compression effect and extension of Markov 
Features. New ideas: CP Features for steganalysis and confidence 
interval as statistical proof for steganalysis performance.
In Chapter 4, the works undertaken exposed how the different image 
sources could affect the steganalysis performance. Our experimental results 
have shown that different image sets (from different databases) have achieved 
different classification accuracies even though the same experimental setup was 
implemented for each image set.
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In order to clarify a claim in [113] that better Markov Features may be achieved 
by using second order transition probability matrix, we then proceeded with its 
implementation as discussed in Section 4.2. However, our findings showed an 
opposite result. W ith a larger number of 2916 features, there was no improvement 
on the detection rates, rather the detection rates were lower than the original 324 
Markov Features. From here, we can see that the most important factor is not 
necessarily the larger number of features, but rather how effective the features are 
for recognising small differences between the cover and stego images.
In addition, we found that the steganalysis features were confused by the effect of 
double compression that occurred as a result of the image preparation and message 
embedding processes. Particularly, on the use of the F5 algorithm implementation 
with F5Software, instead of collecting the statistics from embedding artefact, the 
statistics from the compression process in F5Software were also included into the 
feature set. As an alternative, we proposed the use of the F5Py implementation 
of F5 (which excludes the extra compression process) as a solution for this double 
compression problem as discussed in Section 4.3.
Also in this thesis, the conditional probability based steganalysis features (CP 
Features) were proposed. Chapter 5 demonstrated the effectiveness of CP Features 
for steganalysis when it was tested on the F5 steganography algorithm with 
different embedded message sizes. Furthermore, this thesis brings in a new way 
of comparing the steganalysis performance. To help strengthen the results, a 
confidence interval was applied to provide a statistically significant conclusion for 
comparison of classification performance.
Finally in Chapter 6, the proposed CP Features were also applied to image 
forensic tasks. Not only for the identification of inter-camera models, CP Features 
were also able to identify the source of images on an intra-camera basis. CP 
Features robustness was examined with the use of the processed images. Figure 7.2 
illustrates the discussed research works according to the phases in machine learning 
based camera identification.
7.2 Future Work
This section discusses future research directions with regards to the work 
undertaken in this thesis.
7.2.1 Improvement on Conditional Probability Features
The proposed CP Features were shown to outperform or at least have a comparable 
performance over the D CT Features and Markov Features in steganalysis. 
Furthermore, positive results were achieved when CP Features were used in image 
forensic tasks (Chapter 6). To improve performance of CP Features, we plan to 
increase the number of features. This can be performed by changing the directions 
of p, q and r  in the reverse order. The total number of features will then be 
doubled, but should achieve a better performance in classification accuracy.
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Figure 7.2: Thesis findings and contributions. New ideas: CP Features for image 
source identification.
7.2.2 Performance on DFT and DWT Embedding
This thesis has focused mainly on steganography methods operating on DCT 
coefficients of JPEG images. From the discussion in Section 2.2.3, there exists 
published steganography algorithms that work on DFT and DWT transforms. 
For example in [22], the secret messages were embedded in the high frequency 
coefficients resulting from the DWT transform. We believe that there is a potential 
for CP Features to be applied to the DFT and DWT domains. Therefore, future 
implementations should contribute to a wider use of the CP Features for attacking 
a steganography algorithm that operates in DFT or DWT transform.
7.2.3 CP Features for Video Steganalysis
In this thesis, CP Features were only implemented for digital images. It is 
important to analyse these features for other media types, such as digital video. 
Although the concealment of data in a video is similar to an image, there are 
advantages to use video data because of its large embedding capacity. Currently, 
only a few research work have been published in video steganalysis. As such, this 
is another important area for future research consideration.
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